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"The Convention's goal is to establish white supremacy in
the State, within the limits imposed by the Federal Consti-
tution."
John B. Knox, Alabama Delegate'
INTRODUCION
Minority voting rights are dead-the majority rules. In the last
century and a half, minority access to the ballot box has been, if
not killed, then at least rendered largely unenforceable by a combi-
nation of racial bias in the criminal justice system and the Supreme
Court's so-called "color-blind" jurisprudence, with the result that
meaningful minority access to the electoral process has been great-
ly diminished. Minority disenfranchisement has moved in cycles,
from intentional, direct, de jure disenfranchisement before the Civil
War, through indirect means of exclusion (including felon disen-
franchisement) following Reconstruction and passage of the Fif-
teenth Amendment, to the United States Supreme Court's "color-
blind" jurisprudence, which has interacted with the last remnants of
de jure disenfranchisement to complete the cycle of exclusion. At
the turn of the twenty-first century, the Supreme Court has come
full circle, conjuring up language and imagery more appropriate to
the nineteenth century's Dred Scott and Plessy Courts. The Court's
color blindness has interacted with historical remnants of intention-
al discrimination so as to all but nullify the Voting Rights Act2
and the equal protection clause, perpetuating the legacy of inten-
tional disenfranchisement as effectively as any post-civil war "black
code."
Many scholars have addressed specific changes and remedies
that might make remedies more fair or feasible, or make the Vot-
ing Rights Act more effective.3 This Article explores the premise
Official Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of the State of Alabama, May
21, 1901, to Sept. 3d, 1901 (Second Day) (1901) (statement of Delegate John B. Knox
concerning convict disenfranchisement provisions).
2 Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (1994)).
3, See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Just Politics? Five Not So Easy Pieces of the 1995
Term, 34 Hous. L. REv. 289 (1997); see also LAM GtJnlmR, THE TYRANNY OF THE
MAJORrY 69, 72 (1994) [hereinafter GuINER, TYRANNY OF THE MAJORrIy] (arguing that
the Voting Rights Act should embody the civil rights movement's "transformative vision
of politics"); Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the
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that the Supreme Court's "color-blind" jurisprudence has interacted
with systematic problems such as the disproportionate
criminalization of minorities and the last remaining Jim Crow
laws' to all but nullify the Voting Rights Act's mission to provide
meaningful ballot access for minority populations. This Article
examines the cycle of exclusion from the Civil War to the present.
It begins by examining the Civil War and Reconstruction-era Jim
Crow laws and the agonizingly slow process of establishing
meaningful access to the ballot box that culminated with the Vot-
ing Rights Act. The Article next examines the systematic disman-
tling of minority voting rights through the interaction of Jim Crow
felon disenfranchisement laws and the Supreme Court's "color-
blind" jurisprudence. Finally, the Article proposes that any changes
to the Voting Rights Act will be illusory unless the Court aban-
dons the fiction of the "color-blind" Constitution and returns to an
equal protection analysis of any procedure that burdens minority
groups from achieving effective access to the ballot box.
I. THE CYCLE OF MINORITY DISENFRANCHISEMENT BEGINS
"This plan of popular suffrage will eliminate the darkey as
a political factor in this State in less than five years, so
that in no single county of the Commonwealth will there be
the least concern felt for the complete supremacy of the
white race in the affairs of government."
Carter Glass, Virginia Delegate5
Theory of Black Electoral Success, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1077, 1084-85 (1991) [hereinafter
Guinier, Triumph of Tokenism] (analyzing different voting strategies in the context of the
civil rights movement's quest for human dignity). For a detailed and thoughtful proposal
for a Voting Rights Act analysis of the impact of disenfranchising ex-felons on minority
voting strength, see Alice E. Harvey, Ex-Felon Disenfranchisement and Its Influence on
the Black Vote: The Need for a Second Look, 142 U. PA. L. REv. 1145 (1994).
4. The term "Jim Crow" reportedly first appeared in the North in the 1830s as a
song title in a minstrel show in which white performers performed in "blackface" and
parodied blacks in a derogatory manner. By the 1840s, it was applied to racially segregat-
ed Massachusetts railroad cars and became a generic term for discriminatory race laws.
See generally C. VANN WOODWARD, THm STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 7 n.68 (1966).
5. 2 REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVEN-
TION OF VIRGINIA 3076 (1906) [hereinafter VIRGINIA PROCEEDINGS] (statement of Delegate
Carter Glass). Delegate Glass, who later became a United States senator, said the purpose
of the law was to eliminate "every Negro voter who can be gotten rid of." Benno C.
Schmidt, Jr., Principle and Prejudice: The Supreme Court and Race in the Progressive
Era. Part 1: The Heyday of Jim Crow, 82 COLuM. L. REV. 835, 846 (1982); see also
John Hope Franklin, "Legal" Disenfranchisement of the Negro, 26 J. NEGRO EDuc. 241,
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Race-based exclusion of minority voters is long standing and
deeply rooted. Restrictions on minority voting access have gone
through three distinct phases: outright, explicit disenfranchisement;
indirect disenfranchisement through adoption of laws and practices
that burdened minority voting; and most recently, the Supreme
Court's systematic destruction of all remedies for anything but
outright, explicit disenfranchisement.
A. From De Jure to De Facto Disenfranchisement
"[Tlhe most dangerous threat to democracy is the Ne-
gro .... The Negro is an uncontrollable objector to our
[all-white] ticket."
The Commercial, Pine Bluff, Arkansas, 18926
Passage of the Thirteenth Amendment did not automatically
confer the right to vote.7 Women of all races continued to be dis-
enfranchised until passage of the Nineteenth Amendment, but even
those freedmen ostensibly made full citizens by the abolition of
slavery8 did not automatically obtain the franchise.9 Indeed, the
241 n.1 (1957) (noting that in 1890, some whites were celebrating the apparent defeat of
black voting initiatives); id. at 246 (quoting Delegate Glass as stating the intent to elimi-
nate African-American voters legally, "without materially impairing the numerical strength
of the white electorate"). For the definitive history of the disenfranchisement of African-
Americans in the Reconstruction era, see generally J. MORGAN KOUssER, THE SHAPING
OF SOUTHERN POLITICS: SUFFRAGE RESTRICTION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-
PARTY SOUTH, 1880-1910 (1974).
6 The Commercial, Pine Bluff, Arkansas, 1892. The Pine Bluff Commercial, a Pine
Bluff, Arkansas, newspaper, stressed the racial purpose of the poll tax, urging voters to
pass it "because the most dangerous threat to democracy is the Negro.... The Negro is
an uncontrollable objector to our [all-white] ticket." See C. Calvin Smith, The Politics of
Evasion: Arkansas' Reaction to Smith v. Allwright, 1944, 17 J. NEGRO HisT. 47 (1982)
(copy on file with author).
7, See A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE AND THE
AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS: THE COLONIAL PERIOD 147 (1978) ("Emancipation was not
the key that unlocked the door to full equality."). Even in New York State, where slavery
was abolished before the Civil War, "if emancipation were tied to the granting of equal
civil rights to blacks, the majority of New Yorkers were willing to allow slavery to con-
tinue in their midst" Id.
8 When the Civil War began, and even at the time of the Emancipation Proclama-
tion, no clear plans existed for protecting the rights of the freedmen. See HERMAN BELZ,
EMANCIPATION AND EQUAL RIGHTS: POLITICS AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE CIVIL
WAR ERA 66, 67 (1978). From 1862 to 1865, however, Congress took a number of steps
toward improving the freedmen's lot, see id. at 67, creating the Freedmen's Bureau in
1865 to provide relief and to rent land to the freedmen. See id. at 70-72; see also Alex-
ander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L.
[Vol. 48:727
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denial of voting rights on the basis of race or previous condition
of servitude was both legal and widely practiced.
1. Reconstruction: Intentional, Indirect Disenfranchisement
"Fortunately, the opportunity is offered the white people of
the State in the coming election to obviate all future dan-
ger and fortify Anglo-Saxon civilization against every as-
sault from within and without, and that is the calling of a
constitutional convention to deal with the all important
question of suffrage."
Columbia, S.C., Daily Register, Oct. 10, 18940
Following the 1870 ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution, providing that "[tihe right of citi-
zens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or
abridged ... on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude,""1 direct de jure ballot exclusion of the freedmen"
was illegal. Violence, intimidation, 3  and fraud14 persisted, how-
REV. 1, 8 n.20 (1955).
9. See JOHN M. MATHEWS, LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL HISTORY OF THE FIFTEENTH
AMENDMENT 36 (1909) (noting that the language of the Fifteenth Amendment did not
guarantee the right to vote). See generally WILLIAM GIu.ETrE, THE RIGHr TO VOTE: POL-
mcs AND THE PASSAGE OF THE FIEwmTH AMENDMENT 22-23 (1965). Moreover, "from
the ratification of the [Fourteenth] Amendment in 1868 to 1870 not a single state, with
the sole exception of Minnesota, heeded the warning or yielded to the inducement of the
suffrage clause of the Fourteenth Amendment" William Pickens, The Constitutional Status
of the Negro from 1860 to 1870, in THE AMERiCAN NEGRO ACADEMY OCCASIONAL PA-
PERS 63, 66 (1899) (copy on file with author). But see DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE
NOT SAvED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTiCE 75-88 (1987) (analyzing the "Ulti-
mate Voting Rights Act"); Grier Stephenson, Jr., The Supreme Court, the Franchise, and
the Fifteenth Amendment: The First Sixty Years, 57 UMKC L. REv. 47, 47 (1988) (argu-
ing that the Supreme Court improperly has ignored the Fifteenth Amendment).
,0. DAILY REGISTER (Colombia, S.C.), Oct. 10, 1894, reprinted in George B. Tindall,
The Campaign for the Disenfranchisement of Negroes in South Carolina, 15 J.S. HIST.
212, 224 (1949).
22. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
12 All potential minority voters in this era were male, as women remained disenfran-
chised until passage of the Nineteenth Amendment.
"3 See Tindall, supra note 10, at 213. One account noted-
Seeking to impress on blacks the perils of political involvement, armed bands
rode through the countryside at night during the weeks preceding elections,
firing small arms and sometimes even canon, [sic] and patrolled polling places
on election day. And when they did resort to beatings and murders, they usual-
ly defined their targets carefully and struck quickly rather than inaugurating an
ongoing campaign of terror.
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ever, and white supremacists quickly sought legal but indirect
hurdles to minority voting,"5 including the manipulation of voting
requirements. 6 Unable to bar the freedmen from voting outright
without having their state's representation reduced in Congress,
white southerners created "whites-only" primaries, 7 so that the
general election became a mere runoff between white-preferred
candidates in which minority voters had a vote, but no real
voice.' After Smith v. Allwright 9 struck down Texas' all-white
primary system,2" Arkansas, which had the same system, attempt-
ed to circumvent the holding by imposing lengthy residence re-
quirements," limiting party membership' to whites and establish-
DONALD G. NIEMAN, PROMISES TO KEEP: AFRICAN-AMERICANS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL
ORDER, 1776 TO THE PRESENT, 90-91 (1991). This subtext of terror persisted until the
present. Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee organizer Fannie Lou Hamer noted
the perils of democracy in "the land of the tree and the home of the grave," recounting
the murders of Vernon Dahmer, James Chaney, Medger Evers and others. Neil R.McMillan, Black Enfranchisement in Mississippi: Federal Enforcement and Black Protest
in the 1960s, 43 J.S. HIST. 351, 351, 354 (1977) (citing an interview with Fannie Lou
Hamer, Mississippi Oral History Program, University of Southern Mississippi, Apr. 14,
1972).
" See NiEMAN, supra note 13 at 92.
15. W.E.B. Du BoIs, BLACK RECONSTRUCtION IN AMERICA, 1860-1880, at 5-7
(MacMillan 1992) (1962).
'6 See James E. Alt, The Impact of the Voting Rights Act on Black and White Voter
Registration in the South, in QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF THE
VOTING RIGHTS ACT, 1965-1990, at 351, 354-56 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman,
eds., 1994) (analyzing the effects of institutional mechanisms affecting voter registration in
electing white candidates and keeping blacks in a subordinate position); Tindall, supra
note 10, at 213; see also Armand Derfner, Racial Discrimination and the Right to Vote,
26 VAND. L. REV. 523 (1973) (giving a detailed analysis of the elaborate mechanisms
used to suppress and nullify minority voting, and the long legal battles against these de-
vices).
", See Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights to Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71
TEx. L. REV. 1705, 1709-10 (1993).
's See generally JOEL GRAY TAYLOR, LOUISIANA RECONSTRUCTED, 1863-1877 (1974).
'9- 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
20 See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649,
664 (1944); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 89 (1932); Nixon v. Hemdon, 273 U.S. 536,
540-41 (1927) (holding that a Texas statute that established that "in no event shall a ne-
gro be eligible to participate in a Democratic party primary election" violates equal pro-
tection). Collectively, these are the "White Primary Cases," overturning anti-black Texas
election tactics. For a thorough analysis of the events leading up to these cases, see
Darlene Clark Hine, The Elusive Ballot: The Black Struggle Against the Texas Democratic
White Primary, 1932-45, 81 TEx. STATE HIST. Q. at 371 (copy on file with author).
21. See Alt, supra note 16, at 354-56 (describing the "Magnolia formula" adopted in
Mississippi in 1890 and copied elsewhere, combining literacy or understanding require-
ments, residence requirements and poll taxes to allow disenfranchising migrant workers as
well as former slaves); see also, e.g., Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679, 680 (1973)
(Arizona's 50-day residency rule "pass[es] constitutional muster" because "sufficiently
[VCol. 48:727
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ing separate primaries and run-off elections for black and white
voters? 3 Non-party members could only vote in the primaries if
they accepted the principles of the 1874 Arkansas Constitution,
which included complete racial segregation, a ban on interracial
marriage, and payment of a poll tax.24
By the early 1900s, a majority of states with large populations
of freedmen had adopted poll taxes that effectively eliminated
many potential African-American voters from the pollsO The
Harman v. Forssenius Court expressly noted the use of poll tax-
es as a means to disenfranchise blacks,' and barred their use as a
qualification for voting in federal elections? Literacy29 and "un-
strong local interests," such as the preparation of accurate voter lists, were demonstrated
in support of the rule); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 358-59 (1972) (holding that the
relation between Tennessee's one-year residency requirement and state's interest in an in-
formed electorate too attenuated to be found compelling). Virginia's 1902 Constitution re-
quired a one-year residency for voter registration, a restriction that endured until it was
struck down by a federal court in 1970. See Bufford v. Holton, 319 F. Supp. 843, 846
(E.D. Va. 1970), affid sub noan. Virginia State Bd. of Elections v. Bufford, 405 U.S.
1035 (1972); Andrews v. Cody, 327 F. Supp. 793 (M.D.N.C. 1971), affd, 405 U.S. 1034
(1972) (holding that North Carolina's one-year residency requirement violated equal protec-
tion).
"- Party membership was required for primary voting. See, e.g., Smith v. Allwright,
321 U.S. at 664-65:
The privilege of membership in a party may be . . . no concern of a state.
But when, as here, that privilege is also the essential qualification for voting in
a primary to select nominees for a general election, the state makes the action
of the party the action of the state.
13 Smith, supra note 6, at 49.
24* See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (finding poll
tax unconstitutional under strict scrutiny standard because "wealth or fee paying has . . .
no relation to voting qualifications"); see also Karlan, supra note 17, at 1709-10, 1709
n.13 (noting that the "participatory right [to vote] has been implicated by a variety of re-
strictions on franchise, including white primaries, de-annexation, poll taxes and literacy
tests, durational residency requirements, and, most recently, the power to cast write-in
votes").
25. For details of the use of poll taxes to hinder minority voting, see Alt, supra note
16, at 356. Poll taxes were established in Alabama, see i& at 38-39; 44; Arkansas, see
id. at 356; Florida, see id. at 356; Louisiana, see id. at 356, 414 n.18; Mississippi, see
id. at 137, 146, 156; North Carolina, see id. at 158, 356; South Carolina, see id. at 194,
196, 356; Tennessee, see id at 356; Texas, see id. at 235, 239; and Virginia, see id. at
272-73, 274-76, 356. . Morgan Kousser described the poll tax as the "most effective de-
vice" for restricting black suffrage in Georgia. See KoussER, supra note 5, at 210-15 (cit-
ing figures for the 1892, 1894, and 1896 elections, in which the highest rate of black
turnout was 38.3% in 1894, while white turnout rate was 68.6% in the same year).
26- 380 U.S. 528, 540-54 (1965).
27. See id. at 540-44.
2'. See id. at 544.
29. Literacy requirements endured well into the 20th century. See, e.g., Lassiter v.
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derstanding" tests3" that would disenfranchise the freedmen legally
while appearing neutral on their face were widespread. "Grandfa-
ther"'3  and "old soldier" clauses3 2 made it easier to disenfran-
chise blacks without similarly disenfranchising whites by exempting
from the application of literacy tests and other voting restrictions
anyone who had served in the United States or Confederate army
or navy, their descendants, and anyone who had himself voted, or
whose father had voted, or whose grandfather had voted before
January 1, 1867.
The delegates to the Reconstruction-era state constitutional
conventions that adopted these measures did not hide their inten-
tions: Virginia Delegate William A. Dunning, for example, re-
marked:
Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959) (holding literacy tests to
be rationally related to legitimate state interest in ensuring "intelligent use of the ballot").
30. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. VII, § 181 (repealed 1965) (literacy and understanding
clauses). It was not until 1965 that understanding clauses were declared unconstitutional.
See Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965). Albert Bushnell Hart reported that
shortly after an enactment of the understanding clause in Virginia, a well-educated Afri-
can-American attempting to resister to vote was asked to take such a test. He was asked,
"What clauses of the present Virginia constitution are derived from the Magna Carta?"
The young man replied, "I don't know, unless it is that no negro shall be allowed to
vote in this commonwealth." See Albert Bushnell Hart, The Realities of Negro Suffrage,
1906 PROC. OF THE AM. POL. ScI. Ass'N. 149, 162 (copy on file with author). The
young man was reportedly registered to vote. See id.
, See Schmidt, supra note 5, at 846, 854 n.80 (quoting the Oklahoma Supreme
Court in Atwater v. Hassett, 111 P. 802, 812 (1910) ("Mhe presumption follows ...
that the virtue and intelligence of the ancestors will be imputed to his [sic] descendants,
just as the iniquity of the fathers may be visited upon the children unto the third and
fourth generation.")). Oklahoma had amended its constitution to incorporate a grandfather
clause, but the United States Supreme Court ruled that the clause was unconstitutional be-
cause it perpetuated "the very conditions which the [Fifteenth] Amendment was intended
to destroy." Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 360 (1915). Similarly, in Lane v. Wil-
son, 307 U.S. 268 (1939), the Court invalidated a reenacted grandfather clause, holding
that the Fifteenth Amendment nullified "sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes of
discrimination ... [and] hits onerous procedural requirements which effectively haridicap
exercise of the franchise by the colored race although the abstract right to vote may re-
main unrestricted as to race." Id. at 275.
32 See Schmidt, supra note 5, at 846 ("'Old Soldier's Clause' [provides that] those
who had fought in the Civil War or certain earlier wars, and their lawful descendants,
could register without meeting literacy and property requirements."). For a detailed history
and analysis of the evolution and effect of such devices, see id. at 845-81. A candidate
in the 1905-06 Georgia gubernatorial race argued that without a grandfather clause, the
literacy and understanding clauses would allow 93,000 educated blacks to vote while
"keep[ing] out the votes of many an old democratic hero who was too busy shedding his
blood in defense of Georgia to learn readin', 'ritin', and 'rithmetic." Russell Korobkin,
The Politics of Disenfanchisement in Georgia, 74 GEoRGIA HIST. Q. 296, 326 (1990)
(copy on file with author).
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I do not expect [the understanding test] to be administered
with any degree of friendship... to the suffrage of the
black man. I expect the examination with which the black
man will be confronted to be inspired by the same spirit
that inspires every man upon this floor and in this conven-
tion.I would not expect an impartial administration of the
clause.33
Warming to this theme, he added:
The people of Virginia do not stand impartially between
the suffrage of the white man and the suffrage of the black
man. If they did, the uppermost thoughts in the hearts of
every man within the sound of my voice would not be to
find a way of disenfranchising the black man and enfran-
chising the white man. We do not come here prompted by
an impartial purpose in reference to Negro suffrage.34
The Virginia convention also adopted selective disenfranchisement
of convicted felons as a further means of reducing black electoral
participation.3 These Reconstruction electoral qualifications were
remarkably effective. By 1910, registered voters among the freed-
men dropped to 15% in Virginia, and under 2% in both Alabama
and Mississippi.36
33 VIRGINIA PROCEEDINGS, supra note 5, at 2972 (statement of delegate William A.
Dunning). The literacy test was one of the more effective tools for disenfranchising the
freedmen, for.
Given the legacy of slavery and the meager support for black schools in the
aftermath of Reconstruction, illiteracy among blacks was widespread. In 1890
more than half of the adult black males in the South could not read, and many
others were barely literate. Fairly administered, literacy tests (which required
perspective voters to prove that they could read a provision of the state or
federal constitution) would deny the ballot to most black men; applied by parti-
san white officials who were bitterly opposed to black suffrage, they would cut
even further into the black electorate.
NIEMAN, supra note 13, at 106.
34' VIRGINIA PROCEEDINGS, supra note 5, at 2972 (statement of delegate William A.
Dunning).
3s. See Note, The Need for Reform of Ex-Felon Disenfranchisement Laws, 83 YAE.
LJ. 580, 582-84 (1974); Andrew L. Shapiro, Note, Challenging Criminal Disenfranchise-
ment Under the Voting Rights Act: A New Strategy, 103 YALE LJ. 537 (1993) (discuss-
ing racially motivated disenfranchisement laws).
-'& See NIEMAN, supra note 13, at 107.
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2. Felon Disenfranchisement Laws: Jim Crow's Last Hurrah
"Everybody knows that this Convention has done its best to
disfranchise the negro."
William A. Dunning, Delegate, Virginia Convention37
During Reconstruction, white factions pressing for disenfran-
chisement denounced blacks as "ignorant, lazy, criminally inclined
and venal, a race demonstrably unqualified to exercise [the fran-
chise]." '38 In an effort to prevent African-Americans from voting,
several states enacted felon disenfranchisement laws and "carefully
selected disenfranchising crimes in order to disqualify a dispropor-
tionate number of black voters." '39 The racially discriminatory
roots of felon disenfranchisement and the effect of these laws on
minority vote dilution are seldom considered,' but many of to-
day's laws disenfranchising felons can trace their roots to attempts
by Reconstruction constitutional conventions to enact laws that
would keep black voters out of the electoral process.41 The laws
disqualifying felons have been the most enduring enactments of the
Reconstruction era when states "carefully selected disfranchising
crimes in order to disqualify a disproportionate number of black
37. See 2 OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTUTIONAL CONVENTON OF THE STATE
OF ALABAMA, MAY 21, 1901, TO SEPT. 3D, 1901, at 4782 (1901) [hereinafter ALABAMA
PROCEEDINGS] (statement of Alabama delegate Freeman).
38. NIEMAN, supra note 13, at 108.
31- Ex-Offenders' Voting Rights: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liber-
ties, and the Admin. of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 11
(1974) [hereinafter Voting Rights Hearings] (testimony of John A. Buggs, Staff Director,
United States Commission on Civil Rights).
40" See, e.g., Fox Butterfield, Many Black Men Barred from Voting, N.Y. TmIEs Jan.
30, 1997, at A-12.
4'. Armand Derfner of the Lawyers' Committee for Civil rights Under Law noted that
"disqualifying voters for criminal convictions," . . . "like the poll tax, is an ancient tradi-
tion, but it has often been used to discriminate against blacks, as several Southern states
did in the post-Reconstruction period by adding crimes like petit larceny to the list of
disqualifying crimes." Derfner, supra note 16, at 571 & n.213. These provisions have
been widely reported and discussed. See, e.g., PAUL LEWINSON, RACE, CLASS, AND PAR-
TY: A HISTORY OF NEGRO SUFFRAGE AND WHITE POLIICs IN THE SOUTH 84-86 (1932)
(discussing explicit racism at state constitutional conventions); Harvey, supra note 3, at
1146 & n.6 (1994) (listing statutes); id. at 1177-81 (analyzing the significance of Voting
Rights Act in assessing minority vote-dilution claims in light of felon disenfranchisement);
Shapiro, supra note 35, at 537-42 (collecting statutes). For exhaustive statistical research
and interpretation, see generally C. VANN WOODWARD, ORIGINS OF THE NEW SOUTH
1877-1913 (1951).
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voters. 42  The Alabama Constitution of 1875 disenfranchised
"[t]hose who shall have been convicted of treason, embezzlement
of public funds, malfeasance in office, larceny, bribery, or other
crime punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary."43 As of
1901, section 181 of the Alabama Constitution was amended to
disenfranchise anyone unable to "read and write any article of the
Constitution of the United States in the English language"M as
well as anyone who had not "worked or been regularly engaged in
some lawful employment, business, or occupation, trade, or calling,
for the greater part of twelve months next proceeding the time they
offer to register."45 However, anyone failing to meet these stan-
dards could still vote if he was:
The owner in good faith in his own right, or the husband
of a woman who is the owner in good faith in her own
right, of forty acres of land situate in this state, upon
which they reside, [or] ... assessed for taxation at the
bale of three hundred dollars or more, [provided the taxes
were either paid or legal contested.4
Delegate John B. Knox, later President of the Alabama Consti-
tutional Convention of 1901, announced that the Alabama
convention's goal was "to establish white supremacy ... within
4- Voting Rights Hearings, supra note 39 (testimony of John A. Buggs, Staff Direc-
tor, United States Comm'n on Civil Rights).
43 ALA. CONST. OF 1875, art. VIII, § 3.
4' ALA. CONST. OF 1901, art. VII, § 181. Delaware still retains the provision "that no
person ... shall have the right to vote unless he shall be able to read this Constitution
in the English language and write his name." De . CONST. OF 1897, art. V., § 2.
45. ALA. CONST. OF 1901, art. VIII, § 181.
6 A man who met the above requirements was still disenfranchised if he was dis-
qualified when the constitution was ratified, or if he was later convicted of:
[Tireason, murder, arson, embezzlement, malfeasance in office, larceny, receiving
stolen property, obtaining property or money under false pretenses, perjury,
subornation of perjury, robbery, assault with intent to rob, burglary, forgery,
bribery, assault and battery on the wife, bigamy, living in adultery, sodomy,
incest, rape, miscegenation, crime against nature, or any crime punishable by
imprisonment in the penitentiary, or of any infamous crime or crime involving
moral turpitude; also any person who shall be convicted as a vagrant or tramp,
or of selling or offering to sell his vote or the vote of another, or of buying
or offering to buy the vote of another, or of making or offering to make a
false return in any election by the people or in any primary election to procure
the nomination or election of any person to any office or of suborning any
witness or registrar to secure the registration of any person as an elector.
ALA. CONST. OF 1901, art. VIII, § 182.
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the limits imposed by the Federal Constitution."47 John Fielding
Bums, who drafted the Alabama constitutional felon-disenfranchise-
ment provision, "estimated the crime of wife-beating alone would
disqualify sixty percent of the Negroes."' So-called "robust"
crimes,49 including murder, which the legislators believed equally
likely to be committed by whites, 0 were missing from the list of
crimes precipitating disenfranchisement,5' yet, in Alabama, pre-
venting another person from voting was only a misdemeanor 2
In United States v. Mississippi,5 3 the Supreme Court found
that as of 1890, African-Americans outnumbered whites in Missis-
sippi, but that the literacy, grandfather, and white primary provi-
sions of the 1890 Mississippi convention "worked so well in keep-
ing Negroes from voting... that by 1899 the percentage of quali-
fied voters in the State who were Negroes had declined from over
50% to about 9%, and by 1954 only about 5% of the Negroes of
voting age'in Mississippi were registered.5 4 The Court was per-
suaded in part by the plaintiffs' statistical evidence showing, for
47 ALABAMA PROCEEDINGS, supra note 37, at 7-8 (1901).
41 Shapiro, supra note 35, at 541 (quoting Jimmie Frank Gross, Alabama Politics and
the Negro 244 (1969) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Georgia) (on file with
author)).
. Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213, 266-67 (1898) (citing the Mississippi Su-
preme Court's findings distinguishing between "robust" crimes likely to be committed by
whites, and "furtive" offenses more likely to be committed by African-Americans).
50 See MALCOM COOK McMILLAN, CONSTITIrONAL DEVELOPMENT IN ALABAMA,
1798-1901: A STUDY IN POLITICS, TiE NEGRO, AND SECTIONALISM 275 & n.76 (1955)
("Most of the crimes contained in the report of the suffrage committee [of the Alabama
Constitutional Convention] came from an ordinance by John Fielding Bums, a Black Belt
planter. The crimes he listed were those he had taken cognizance of for years in his jus-
tice of the peace court . .. where nearly all his cases involved Negros.").
", See Shapiro, supra, note 35, at 541 ("Mississippi's 1890 constitutional convention,
which became a model for other states, replaced an 1869 constitutional provision disen-
franchising citizens convicted of 'any crime' with a narrower section disenfranchising only
those convicted of certain crimes, which blacks were supposedly more likely than whites
to commit."), see also Ratliff v. Beale, 20 So. 865 (1896) (finding that blacks were more
likely than whites to commit the enumerated crimes).
52 See JIMMIE FRANK GROSS, ALABAMA PoLTIcs AND THE NEGRO, 1874-1901, at 65-
66 (1969).
5'- 380 U.S. 128 (1965) (holding that the State of Mississippi, for three quarters of a
century, systematically designed discriminatory constitutional provisions, statutes, and regu-
lations to keep the number of black voters as low as possible).
5 See id. at 132; see also W. Roy Smith, Negro Suffrage in the South, in STUDIES
IN SOUTHERN HISTORY AND PoLiTiCS 231, 242 (1914) ("There was a general feeling, in
the North as well as in the South, that if the negro was to be excluded from his political
privileges in any case it would be better for all concerned to have it done legally rather
than illegally.").
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example, that Amite County, Mississippi (whose registrar was a
defendant), had a white voting age population of 4449, of whom
3295 were registered to vote, while only one of the 2560 voting
age African-Americans was registered.'5 The Mississippi Supreme
Court.had held that
By reason of its previous condition of servitude and depen-
dence, this race had acquired or accentuated certain particu-
larities of habit, of temperament and of character, which
clearly distinguished it as a race from that of the
whites,--a patient, docile people, but careless, landless, and
migratory within narrow limits, without forethought, and its
criminal members given rather to furtive offenses than to
the robust crimes of the whites. Restrained by the federal
constitution from discriminating against the negro race, the
convention discriminated against its characteristics and the
offenses to which its weaker members were prone.6
In enacting felon disenfranchisement provisions, the Mississippi
constitutional convention of 1890 "paved the way for wholesale
exclusion of the negroes on perfectly legal grounds . .. The ulti-
mate ideal, of course, was to exclude all negroes and no
whites." The delegates from the white counties were reportedly
" See United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. at 144. In Williams v. Mississippi, an
African-American defendant indicted by an all-white grand jury and convicted by an all-
white jury challenged his conviction on the grounds that the jury pool was limited to reg-
istered voters, and that the African-American community had been deliberately disenfran-
chised by the Mississippi constitutional convention. 170 U.S. 213, 214-15 (1898). The Su-
preme Court acknowledged the Mississippi Supreme Court's finding that the 1890 conven-
tion had "swept the circle of expedients to obstruct the exercise of the franchise by the
negro race," id. at 222, but held that nothing in the United States Constitution prohibits a
state from taking advantage of "the alleged characteristics of the negro race." Id. at 222.
These efforts at legal disenfranchisement proved successful. See also Franklin, supra note
5, at 247 ("By 1910 the white supremacists could rest much more comfortably than they
did in 1890. Every former Confederate state had strengthened its stand against Negro vot-
ing by 'legally' disenfranchising Negroes. There seemed to be nothing that anyone could
do about it.").
-6- Ratliff, 20 So. at 868 (emphasis added). The court added: "Burglary, theft, arson,
and obtaining money under false pretenses were declared to be disqualifications, while
robbery and murder and other crimes in which violence was the principal ingredient were
not" Id. For a detailed discussion of Ratliff, see JoHN L. LovE, THE DISFRANCHIsEMENT
OF THE NEGRO 20 (1899) (copy on file with author) (describing the Mississippi Supreme
Court's findings as "[t]he most remarkable judicial utterance since the famous Dred Scott
decision."); Shapiro, supra note 35, at 541 (discussing lRatlif).
57 Lov, supra note 56, at 15. Albert Bushnell Hart, writing near the time of the
events, observed:
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suspicious that disenfranchisement provisions would eliminate much
of the white constituency as well. 58 Finally, a satisfactory combi-
nation of qualifications was reached including disenfranchisement
for conviction of a crime. One observer called attention to the fact
that
The crimes mentioned as disqualifying [a person] from
voting are such as it is always easy, when desirable, to
convict the Negro of committing. Under the present method
of administering justice in the states where these disenfran-
chising constitutions operate, the Negro has neither any
guarantee of a fair and impartial trial nor any protection
against malicious prosecution or false accusations when it
is convenient to convict him.5
Historian J. Morgan Kousser, who testified as an expert witness
in Hunter v. Underwood, supported the view that felon disenfran-
chisement laws were specifically intended to serve as insurance if
courts struck down more blatantly unconstitutional clauses.
The disenfranchisement of felons in South Carolina quickly
followed suit.6 As in Mississippi, the convention adopted a felon
disenfranchisement provision excluding persons "who were invari-
ably Negroes, convicted of a specified list of crimes." 2 The result
With a view to cut down negro suffrage .. . [t]he disqualification for crime
have also been somewhat enlarged and possibly a penalty involving disfran-
chisement is sometimes affixed by judges upon a negro which would not be
assigned to a white man.
The important thing to remember in this process is that as a matter
of fact the negro vote has been suppressed . . . There is hardly room for dis-
cussion with our Southern brethren as to whether they mean or expect to take
away negro suffrage-they have done so practically.
Hart, supra note 30, at 159-60. The South Carolina provisions were so complex that their
author told Hart that he himself had failed to follow them correctly and had lost his own
vote in the election following their enactment. Id. at 163; see also Alt, supra note 16, at
354-55 (discussing how Mississippi's "Magnolia formula" for disenfranchising African-
Americans was copied throughout the former Confederacy).
58. See Franklin, supra note 5, at 244.
5' See LovE, supra note 56, at 16.
'° See J. Morgan Kousser, The Undermining of the First Reconstruction: Lessons for
the Second, in MiNORrrY VOTE DILUtION 27 (Chandler Davidson ed., 1984); Shapiro,
supra note 35, at 537 (reviewing Kousser's statistics).
6" See Franklin, supra note 5, at 244 ("In order to write a fundamental law that
would disfranchise all Negroes and, at the same time, permit every white person however
ignorant or poor, to vote, Ben Tillman left his seat in the United States Senate to serve
as chairman of the convention's suffrage committee.").
62- Id. at 245.
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was predictable: In 1868, South Carolina saw eleven freedmen
elected to the state Senate and 82 to the state House; in 1896, no
freedmen were elected to the state Senate, and only one was voted
into the state House.6
Similar developments occurred in other states. Louisiana's
minority vote declined from more than 130,000 voting in 1896 to
5,320 registered in 1900, two years after enactment of the Recon-
struction constitution." This number dropped to 1,342 by 1904.'
After Alabama enacted its disenfranchising constitution in 1900, a
mere 3,000 of 180,000 African-Americans were registered to
vote.' Despite the infamous Black Codes,67 Mississippi in 1867
had nearly 70% of the eligible African-American population regis-
tered. This number declined to less than 6% within two years of
the enactment of disenfranchising laws at the state's 1890 constitu-
tional convention.'
Felony disenfranchisement laws still exist in many states, and
still effectively deny voting rights to many minorities, despite their
facial neutrality.69
63. See Tindall, supra note 10, at 216 tbl.
' See Schmidt, supra note 5, at 847 (citing figures compiled by WOODWARD, supra
note 4, at 56, 68); see also Derfner, supra note 16, at 542.
6- See Schmidt, supra note 5, at 842 (citing Woodward's statistics).
66. See Ud; see also GROSS, supra note 52, at 274.
. For a detailed history of Reconstruction and the Black Codes, see generally W.E.B.
Du Bois, supra note 15. See also The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 70
(1872):
Among the first acts of legislation adopted by several of the States . .. were
laws which imposed upon the colored race onerous disabilities and burdens, and
curtailed their rights in the pursuit of life, liberty, and property to such an
extent that their freedom was of little value..... They were in some States
forbidden to appear in the towns in any other character than menial servants.
They were required to reside on and cultivate the soil without the right to
purchase or own it. They were excluded from many occupations of gain, and
were not permitted to give testimony in the courts in any case where a white
man was a party. It was said that their lives were at the mercy of bad men,
either because the laws for their protection were insufficient or were not en-
forced.
68. See Shapiro, supra note 35, at 538. Mississippi's efforts to keep blacks from exer-
cising the vote did not stop even upon passage of the Voting Rights Act in 1965. See
generally FRANK R. PARKER, BLACK VOTES COrNT. PoITrIcAL EMPOWERMENT IN MissIs-
siPI AFrtE 1965 (1990) (describing the state's efforts to nullify the black vote after the
Voting Rights Act became law).
. The effect of these laws on current voting rights will be discussed later in this
Article. See infra Part HILA.
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B. The Voting Rights Act: A Temporary High Point
"[Tihe convention swept the circle of expedients to obstruct
the exercise of the franchise by the negro race."'70
The Voting Rights Act of 196571 prohibits any "voting quali-
fication... which results in a denial... of the right... to vote
on account of race or color."72 Enacted to enforce the Fifteenth
Amendment,73 it has been described as "the most successful piece
of federal civil rights legislation ever enacted."74 The Voting
Rights Act was passed at least in part in response to Wright v.
Rockefeller,75 in which Latino and African-American voters chal-
lenged a New York County76 congressional districting plan which,
they alleged, racially segregated districts in violation of the Four-
teenth and Fifteenth Amendments."7 The Wright Court rejected the
'. Ratliff v. Beale, 20 So. 865, 868 (1896).
71- 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971 to 1973gg-10 (1994).
7' Id. § 1973(a). The text of this section is set out below, with the 1982 amendments
indicated with strikeouts for deleted text and brackets surrounding added text:
No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or pro-
cedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision I&
dent [which results in a denial] or abridge[ment of] the right of any citizen of
the United States to vote on account of race or color[, or in contravention of
the guarantees set forth in section 1973b(f)(2) of this title, as provided in sub-
section (b) of this section.]
[(b) A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on the
totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to
nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open
to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection
(a) . . . in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the
electorate to participate in the political process'and to elect representatives of
their choice. The extent to which members of a protected class have been
elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which
may be considered: Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right to
have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion
in the population . . . ].
. Congressional authority to establish the requirements of the Voting Rights Act derives
from U.S. Const. amend. XV, § 2, which provides: "The Congress shall have power to
enforce this article by appropriate legislation." See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S.
301, 337 (1966) (upholding the Voting Rights Act as a legitimate exercise of congressional
power under the Fifteenth Amendment).
74. Drew S. Days LIU, Section 5 and the Role of the Justice Department, in CONTROVERSIES IN
MINORITY VOTING: THE VOTING RIGmS Act IN PERSPECIvE 52 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler
Davidson eds., 1992).
7S. 376 U.S. 52 (1964).
76- New York County consists of Manhattan Island.
77- See Wright, 376 U.S. at 54.
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constitutional challenge, finding that despite evidence "that the New
York Legislature was motivated by racial considerations or in fact
drew the districts on racial lines," 8 plaintiffs had still not proven
that the legislature's districting was done on the basis of race,
since the same evidence could support other possible inferences. 9
The Voting Rights Act was in some ways a high point of the
struggle to breathe life into the minority electoral franchise. Once
viewed as the culmination of the civil rights movement of the
1950s and 1960s,8" it faced immediate attack. Advocates of
"States' rights" immediately challenged its constitutionality, but in
South Carolina v. Katzenbach,8 ' the Supreme Court affirmed its.
constitutionality. 82
The 1965 passage of the Voting Rights Act was intended to
address both direct and indirect obstacles to minority voting, such
as those at issue in Wright, but racial "bloc" voting by whites
tended to defeat black candidates except in districts where minority
voters predominated.83 White incumbents quickly moved to re-
structure precincts into multi-member districts from which candi-
dates were elected "at large," thus diluting the effect of the minori-
ty vote by consistently defeating the minority-preferred candi-
date.84
7L Id. at 56.
. See id. at 56-58. In White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 759 (1973), plaintiffs chal-
lenged a Texas redistricting plan on the grounds that the plan created "impermissible devi-
ations from population equality," and that the multi-member districts it created
impermissibly diluted minority voting power. The Court rejected the "impermissible devia-
tion" claim. See id. at 764. It held, however, that the multi-member district did violate
the Fourteenth Amendment by impermissibly diluting the voting strength of the racial mi-
norities in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 769-70.
'* See Leroy D. Clark, The Future Civil Rights Agenda: Speculation on Litigation,
Legislation, and Organization, 38 CATH. U. L. REv. 795, 830 n.182 (1989).
st South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
8 See id. at 337 ("This may have been an uncommon exercise of congressional power,
as South Carolina contends, but the Court has recognized that exceptional conditions can
justify legislative measures not otherwise appropriate."); id. at 334.
See NIMAN, supra note 13, at 213.
w See iL C'[I]f members were elected at-large, with voters throughout the city casting
ballots for all five seats, the white majority could preserve a My-white council.").
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1. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.
"[Als for the equality, you know us white men will not
tolerate it."
W.L. Peck, Populist Candidate
for Governor, Georgia, 1892'
The Voting Rights Act has two principal provisions. Section 2,
which forbids imposition or application of any "voting qualification
or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure ... by
any state or political subdivision in a manner which results in a
denial or abridgement of the right of an citizen of the United
States to vote on account of race or color,' 8 6 and § 5, which re-
quires federal approval of changes in voting procedures in areas
with a history of discrimination.
According to the legislative history, Congress used the words
"on account of race or color" in the Act to mean "with respect to"
race or color, and not to connote any required purpose of racial
discrimination.' If there had been any doubt that Congress in-
tended to abolish all voting inequities, these doubts should have
been laid to rest by the 1982 amendment to § 2.88 By passing the
" Korobkin, supra note 32, at 28 (quoting W.L. Peek, Populist candidate for gover-
nor of Georgia, in the Atlanta Constitution, Aug. 23, 1892).
86. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1994) (listing violations contained within the Act).
87- S. REP. No. 417, at 206 n.109 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 205-
08.
' Section 2, as amended, provides:
No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or proce-
dure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a
manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of
the United States to vote on account of race or color. . . . A violation of
subsection (a) . . . is established if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is
shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State
or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a
class of citizens protected by subsection (a) . . . in that its members have less
opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political
process and to elect representatives of their choice. The extent to which mem-
bers of a protected class have been elected to office in the State or political
subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered: Provided, That noth-
ing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class
elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population.
Voting Rights Act Amends. of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131, 134 (1982) (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973, 1973(b), 1973(aa)-(la), 1973(aa)-6(a) (1988))
[hereinafter Voting Rights Act Amends. of 1982]. This section was amended expressly to
abolish the judge-made intent requirement expressed in Baker v. Carr.
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amendment, Congress intended to guarantee equal protection of the
voting laws to all citizens, without any requirement of a showing
of intent. The legislative history indicates that "even a consistently
applied practice premised on a racially neutral policy would not
negate a plaintiff's showing through other factors that the chal-
lenged practice denies minorities fair access to the process." '89 In
what came to be known as the "results" test, amended § 2 bars all
voting qualifications, standards, practices, or procedures that result
in a minority group having "less opportunity than other members
of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice." The 1982 "results" test was not
a radical Congressional invention; the Court itself had applied this
test in earlier cases to strike down schemes or procedures that had
resulted in the electoral exclusion of a minority community9 even
without showing an intent to discriminate.' Instead of looking for
invidious purpose, amended § 2 calls for a "totality of the circum-
stances" analysis of the harmful effects of any challenged election
plan.
2. Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act prohibits localities with a
history of voting discrimination from effectuating any new voting
procedures, including new districts, without first completing
"preclearance," i.e., obtaining Justice Department or U.S. District
Court approval of any changes that may have a negative effect on
the minority community's ability to elect their chosen representa-
tives.93 Section 5 thus attempts to prevent any new forms of indi-
rect discrimination from taking effect, but it does not address pro-
cedures that were in effect when it was enacted. 94  This
"preclearance" provision was initially set to expire after five
" S. REP. No. 417, at 206 n.109 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 205-
08.
" Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1988).
91- See Clark, supra note 80, at 831 & n.183; see also Pleasant Grove v. United
States, 479 U.S. 462, 464 (1987) (holding that annexation of all-white area to an all
white city was a "change" in voting practice and procedure subject to Justice Department
clearance; clearance denied because of history of racial discrimination and city's refusal to
annex predominantly black neighborhood).
92 See, e.g., White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973) (explaining vote dilution analysis
listing evidentiary factors plaintiffs may use to establish their case).
- 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (1994). For a comprehensive analysis of the provisions and
operations of § 5, see Derfner, supra note 16, at 576-81.
9 See NmMAN, supra note 13, at 215.
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years,95 but Congress extended its application for five years in
1970, for seven years in 1975, and for twenty-five years in
1982.96
In United Jewish Organizations v. Carey,' a plurality of the
Court held that the Constitution did not prevent a jurisdiction that
was subject to the Voting Rights Act from deliberately creating or
maintaining majority-black districts in order to insure that a reap-
portionment plan satisfies the Act. Plaintiffs from Kings County,
New York, a jurisdiction covered under § 5, challenged redistrict-
ing legislation that split the Hasidic Jewish community into two
districts in order to create significant nonwhite majorities in these
districts." Members of the Hasidic Jewish community sued, alleg-
ing that splitting their community in order to create majority-black
electoral districts unfairly diluted the Hasidic community's voting
power. A plurality of the Supreme Court affirmed the district
court's dismissal of the suit, on the grounds the United States
Constitution allowed states to create or preserve majority-minority
districts in order to satisfy the requirements of § 5 of the Voting
Rights Act. Further, the plurality held that racial criteria could be
used in districting and apportionment plans, and that their use is
not limited to plans attempting to remedy past discrimination, af-
firming the district court's holding that use of race was justified as
long as the districting "is in conformity with the unchallenged
directive of and has the approval of the Attorney General," and the
resulting plan is not "unfairly prejudicial to white[s] or non-
white[s]." 99 Justice Brennan, by contrast, found that race-conscious
districting could be constitutional when Congress had expressly
adopted such a remedial policy, as in the Voting Rights Act. °°
After several decades of Voting Rights Act litigation, the per-
centage of African-Americans of voting age registered to vote in
the South, which was approximately 3% in 1940, increased from
43.3% (22.5% in the Deep South) in 1934 to approximately
9'- See id. at 214.
9- See id.
97- 430 U.S. 114 (1977).
9a See id. at 151-52.
99- Id. at 155.
100- See id. at 175 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("However the'Court ultimately decides the
constitutional legitimacy of 'reverse discrimination' pure and simple, I am convinced that
the application of the Voting Rights Act substantially minimizes the objections to prefer-
ential treatment, and legitimates the use of even overt, numerical racial devices in elector-
al redistricting.").
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63.7%.'0' In addition, the number of minority members elected to
public office rose noticeably, " - vividly demonstrating just how
pressing the need was for the remedies provided by the Voting
Rights Act.
It is somewhat ironic that without the increase in minority
voting strength between 1965 and 1980, members of Congress
would have been far less likely to support the 1982 amend-
ments." As it was, however, incumbent minority representatives
overcame vigorous Reagan administration opposition to pass the
1982 amendments to the Act, which outlawed any practices, includ-
ing those already in place which, in the totality of circumstances,
gave the minority electorate less opportunity than other members of
the electorate to elect representatives of their choice.
C. Dismantling the Voting Rights Act
Particularly in its amended form, the Voting Rights Act had
great potential for leveling the playing field between majority and
minority interests, but the Supreme Court's right wing immediately
began dismantling its key provisions. The present Court's definition
of equal representation appears to be satisfied simply by ensuring
each individual formal access to the ballot. The effect that the
system has on the impact and strength of that vote as combined
with other votes is not considered.'0 5
'o1 See Chandler Davidson, The Recent Evolution of Voting Rights Law Affecting Ra-
cial and Language Minorities, in QUIET REVOLUTION OF THE SOUTH: THE IMPACr OF THE
VOTING RIGHTS ACT, 1965-1990, supra note 16, at 21, 29-30. Dr. Davidson defines the
"Deep South" for statistical purposes as Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi and the Carolinas.
See id. at 30.
1w- See Lisa A. Kelly, Race and Place: Geographic and Transcendent Community in
the Post-Shaw Era, 49 VAND. L. REV. 227, 239-40 (1996); Steven L. Lapidus, Note,
Eradicating Racial Discrimination in Voter Registration: Rights and Remedies under the
Voting Rights Act Amends of 1982, 52 FORDHAM L. REv. 93, 97 (1983) (summarizing the
benefits which the Voting Rights Act provides to minorities).
103. See KoussEm, supra note 5, at 151 (noting the correlation between expansion of
the franchise during the "second Reconstruction" and greater support by Southern members
of Congress from voting rights legislation).
'0' 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994); see also NMMAN, supra note 13, at 217-18 (detailing
the Reagan administration's vigorous opposition to the amendments, and the battles result-
ing in their enactment).
'0o- See Voting Rights Act Amends. of 1982, supra note 88; see also Gomez v.
Watsonville, 863 F.2d 1407 (9th Cir. 1988) (challenges to at-large voting plans by Lati-
nos); Windy Boy v. Big Horn, 647 F. Supp. 1002 (D. Mont. 1986) (challenges to at-large
voting plans by Native-Americans). See generally, Su Sun Bai, Comment, Affirmative Pur-
suit of Political Equality for Asian Pacific Americans: Reclaiming the Voting Rights Act,
139 U. PA. L. REV. 731 (1991) (focusing on discriminatory barriers that confront non-
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1. Conflating Individual and Community Interests:
Wesley v. Collins
In Wesley v. Collins,'°6 a vote-denial and vote-dilution claim
based on felon disenfranchisement, the petitioner alleged that
Tennessee's law disenfranchising him upon acceptance of a guilty
plea violated the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. 7 The
Court found that the felon disenfranchisement provisions" were
not motivated by an intent to exclude racial minorities, and denied
plaintiff's appeal. In so doing, it grafted onto the statutory lan-
guage a new burden of proof of intentional discrimination not
present in the statute or relevant precedents. 9 This set the stage
for a long line of cases in which individual rights and group rights
are conflated, to the detriment of both.110
In Wesley, the § 2 violation was not the outright disenfran-
chisement of the particular individuals convicted of the specified
offenses.' Rather, the violation was the dilution of the innocent
minority community's voting strength. It is the group as a whole
that has the protected rights under § 2, and selective disenfran-
chisement laws that affect the group as a whole, though directed at
the individual, should logically fit within its framework."' More
English spealdng Asian Pacific-Americans and the effect of vote dilution that has excluded
them from the political process).
1o6 Wesley v. Collins, 605 F. Supp. 802, 807 n.4 (M.D. Tenn. 1985), affd, 791 F.2d
1255 (6th Cir. 1986).
'07. See id. at 803-04.
"o See id. at 813. As one observer has commented, "[If the Voting Rights Act's re-
sults test had been properly applied, the plaintiffs would not have had to produce evi-
dence of racially discriminatory intent at all." Shapiro, supra note 35, at 552 n.87.
.'9. See Wesley, 605 F. Supp. at 807. Congress had explicitly rejected the intent test.
See Shapiro, supra note 35, at 550 & nn.70-71; cf Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S.
237, 250 (1991) (holding that once a school board has complied in good faith with a de-
segregation order and "the vestiges of de jure segregation have been eliminated as far as
practicable," a school district should be released from an injunction imposing a desegrega-
tion plan).
1"0 See Wesley, 605 F. Supp. at 807 n.4. Professor Gotanda has criticized the Court's
acceptance of the lower court's reasoning: "The Court considered neither .. . Michigan's
participation in maintaining de jure segregation nor government policies supporting the es-
tablishment of white-dominated housing in the suburbs as a basis for inter-district relief."
Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-blind", 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 45
n.177 (1991).
"' See Shapiro, supra note 35, at 553 n.91 (stating that the flaw in this argument is
that § 2 states that a violation of the Act occurs when a minority group has less opportu-
nity than other groups to participate in the electoral process).
"2- See Voting Rights Hearings, supra note 39, at 16 (Rep. Robert W. Kastemneler,
Chair, stating, "[P]ractically this may not now be realizable but I think [votes for prison-
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a propos is the Fifth Circuit view in Presley, which invalidated an
election in which black voters had been forced to use segregated
booths if they wanted to participate, despite the fact that it was a
mathematical impossibility for the excluded voters to have changed
the outcome.
Presley v. Etowah County Commission"3 was not, as the
Court suggested, a dramatic expansion of § 5 powers. Rather, the
judicial branch of the government was asked to enforce the execu-
tive branch's exercise of the power established for it by the legisla-
tive branch. Not until Congress empowered the federal executive
branch to register voters and to use § 5 to block new disenfran-
chising and vote-diluting tactics were African-Americans effectively
enfranchised.114 The Justice Department challenged the Etowah
County, North Carolina, County Commissions' Common Fund and
Road Supervision Resolutions as fairly obvious attempts to perpetu-
ate indirectly what had previously been openly achieved: the exclu-
sion of Etowah County's black citizens from county governance.
This is a classic example of a maneuver that does not interfere
with the minority population's ability to go to the polls and cast a
vote, but which puts in place sophisticated stratagems to render
that right is rendered nugatory in terms of affecting outcomes. The
Court, however, refused to recognize the county's tactic of indirect
minority disenfranchisement.
There are, of course, potential problems with creating
"majority-minority" districts. While creating such districts guaran-
tees a voice for an otherwise excluded community, it may also
have a "ghetto" effect, cutting off both voters and candidates from
any possible across-the-board coalition forming, and guaranteeing
that the remaining white districts will dominate the resulting el-
ected body. Additionally, limiting remedies to communities that are
large enough to constitute majorities in their districts overlooks the
possibility of influencing outcomes through swing voting. Often
overlooked, however, is that majority-minority districting only
comes into consideration when the voice of the minority communi-
ty has been effectively silenced through majority "bloc" voting that
has consistently defeated the minority community's preferred candi-
dates.
ers] ought to be the goal eventually if we are interested in a truly universal franchise:).
"- 502 U.S. 491, 495-99 (1992).
"4- See Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 156 (1965) (striking down literacy,
character, and understanding tests as purposefully discriminatory).
1998]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
2. Section 5 and Non-Retrogression: Accepting
Minimal Compliance
It was not until 1976, however, that the Court applied § 5 to a
redistricting plan. In Beer v. United States,115 upholding the legal-
ity of a redistricting plan that generally improved minority repre-
sentation, though not as much as possible, the Court established the
"non-retrogression" rule, holding that a plan is acceptable even if it
does not eliminate vote dilution, so long as it does not lead to an
actual "retrogression in the position of racial minorities. 6 In
Beer, the city of New Orleans had sued under § 5 for approval of
a plan to redraw the city council districts. The trial court found the
proposed redistricting plan valid under the Voting Rights Act, but
the Supreme Court reversed, finding that the plan improved minori-
ty electoral influence compared with the former plan. The Supreme
Court held that minimal compliance with the Voting Rights Act
was sufficient if the new reapportionment plan would not "lead to
a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to
the effective exercise of the franchise." ' 7 Thus, the Beer Court
moved in a small but significant way toward undercutting the
available remedies for minority dilution. The "non-retrogression"
principle was, in a sense, the foot in the door for the Rehnquist
Court's color-blind jurisprudence and the subsequent death of mi-
nority voting rights.
II. DISMANTLING EQUAL PROTECTION: INNOCENCE AND
INTENTIONAL HARM
"I take a dim view of this pathological search for discrimi-
nation. It is about time the Court faced the fact that the
white people of the South don't like the colored people."
William Rehnquist, Now Chief Justice" 8
The prevalence of tactics expressly intended to prevent the
freedmen from exercising their newly-acquired rights was one
reason for passage of the Equal Protection Clause. On May 23,
,S. 425 U.S. 130 (1976).
"6 ld. at 141.
1. See id.
118" Memorandum from William Rehnquist, in HARRY S. ASHMORE, CIVIL RIGHTS AND
WRONGS: A MEMOIR OF RAcE AND POLrrIcs 1944-1994, at 342 (1994).
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1866, Senator Jacob Howard explained the language of the equal
protection clause, saying:
This abolishes all class legislation in the States and does
away with the injustice of subjecting one caste of persons
to a code not applicable to another. It prohibits the hanging
of a black man for a crime for which the white man is not
to be hanged. It protects the black man in his fundamental
rights as a citizen with the same shield which it throws
over the white man. Is it not time, Mr. President, the we
extend to the black man, I had almost called it the poor
privilege of the equal protection of the law? Ought not the
time to be now passed when one measure of justice is to
be meted out to a member of one caste while another and
a different measure is meted out to the member of another
caste, both castes being alike citizens of the United States,
both bound to obey the same laws, to sustain the burdens
of the same Government, and both equally responsible to
justice and to God for the deeds done in the body?119
Under the first principles of equal protection, racially biased
application of an otherwise constitutional penalty would seem to
violate equal protection under the Federal Constitution, and perhaps
under state constitutional guarantees as well. At a minimum, states
whose disenfranchisement laws were originally adopted in order to
disenfranchise minority voters would seem to violate the principle
of equal protection of the laws. For many years, Supreme Court
jurisprudence recognized a Fourteenth Amendment collective equal




In 1964, in what the late Chief Justice Warren regarded as his
most important opinion," the Supreme Court ruled that individu-
19. Senator Howard, Speech, in 39th Cong. 2766 (1866).
10 See, e.g., Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 113, 124 (1986) (applying an equal
protection analysis to political gerrymandering claims, and reversing the district court's
finding that Indiana's state legislative apportionment did not unconstitutionally dilute Dem-
ocratic votes in the largely Republican state). Concurring in the judgment, Justice
O'Connor said: "Mhe partisan gerrymandering claims of major political parties raise a
nonjusticiable political question that the judiciary should leave to the legislative branch as
the Framers of the Constitution unquestionably intended." Id. at 144-45 (1986) (O'Connor,
J., concurring in the judgment).
121. See, e.g., white v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765 (1973) (holding that multimember
districting used invidiously to dilute minority votes is illegal).
'"- See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 560, cited in G. EDWARD WHTE, EARL
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als have a right to "fair and effective representation." In Reynolds
v. Sims"2 the Court held that "the Equal Protection Clause guar-
antees the opportunity for equal participation by all voters in the
election of state legislators.', 4 Reynolds had established the "one
man, one vote" principle, requiring electoral redistricting each
decade based on the latest census,"'2 and had recognized that the
"right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and democratic
society." 26 Even when there has been little or no net gain or
loss in population in a particular jurisdiction, redistricting can still
be required because of shifting populations within the jurisdic-
tion.2 7 The Reynolds Court held, "the right to vote freely for the
candidate of one's choice is of the essence of a democratic society,
and any restrictions on that right strike at the heart of representa-
tive government.""n'
Despite its undeniable impact, Reynolds also has been described
as a "spectacular failure.', 129 Cynical misapplication of Reynolds'
"one-man, one-vote" rule has proven to be a powerful tool in the
cycle from post-Civil War, direct disenfranchisement to post-Cold
War, indirect disenfranchisement of America's minority communi-
ties, undermining the values embodied in the Voting Rights
Act.13 The result of all this has been that recently, litigation un-
der the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
has been unsuccessful because of the Court's reading of section 2
WARREN: A PUBLIC LnPE 337 (1982).
'23 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
'24- Id. at 566.
See id. at 583 ("Decennial reapportionment appears to be a rational approach to
readjustment of legislative representation in order to take into account population shifts
and growth.").
'26. Id. at 561-62.
". See, e.g., Quilter v. Voinovich, 794 F. Supp. 695, 705-06 (N.D. Ohio 1992)
(Dowd, J., dissenting) (describing that a 50,000 person gain in the total Ohio population
of approximately 10 million people still required that "the majority of the 1981 configured
districts in [all] major urban counties had to be reconfigured to meet the population re-
quirements" of the Ohio Constitution); rev'd, 507 U.S. 146 (1993).
'21 Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 555. Reynolds relied on Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S.
339 (1960) (gerrymandering to exclude minority voters); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461
(1953) (whites-only primaries); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (whites-only pri-
maries); and United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941) (racially motivated electoral
fraud).
129. Karlan, supra note 17, at 1705.
3" See id. at 1708 (One-person, one-vote allows for the invocation of judicial over-
sight but falls to check "partial" interpretations of the act by an increasingly partisan judi-
ciary).
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of the Fourteenth Amendment. Furthermore, there is no reason to
believe that the current Court majority will be interested in redress-
ing vote dilution caused by minority disenfranchisement, particular-
ly since disenfranchisement has constitutional authorization under
the Court's current color-blind scheme.
131
The current Supreme Court, in its rush to dismantle remedies
for racial bias, has disregarded original constitutional principles in
following its own anti-civil rights agenda and turned its back on
the letter and spirit of this vision of the equal protection of the
law. The Rehnquist Court's disingenuously color-blind attitude has
placed the Court of the 1990s squarely at the forefront of 19th
Century jurisprudence, adopting the rationales that were used to
strike down the original post-Civil War Civil Rights Statutes. 32
A. The Rise of "Color Blindness"
The currently fashionable "color-blind" characterization of the
constitution hails from Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy v.
Ferguson:
13 3
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this
country. And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in edu-
cation, in wealth and in power ... But in view of the
Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country
13'. See Karlan, supra note 3. As Professor Karlan points out, the Court refused in
Holder v. Hall to allow a vote dilution challenge to the size of a governing body under
§ 2 of the Voting Rights Act because, the Kennedy plurality said, the concept of vote
dilution requires that there be a "norm with respect to which the fact of dilution may be
ascertained.' Id at 303 (quoting Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 880 (1994)). Justices
Thomas and Scalia apparently do not recognize the existence of racial vote and in any
case would not apply the Voting Rights Act to claims of racial vote dilution. See id. at
309. Professor Karlan notes that the Court has identified no circumstances under which
the intentional creation of a majority-minority district would survive strict scrutiny. See id.
at 290; see also Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 1973 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring)
("Strict scrutiny applies to all governmental classifications based on race [and] there is no
exception for race-based redistricting."); id. at 1971 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (suggesting
that strict scrutiny applies "whenever a State, in redistricting, foreordains that one race be
the majority in a certain number of districts . . . ").
' Id. For an in-depth analysis of the Court's "color-blind" jurisprudence in the con-
text of multicultural America, see Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis: Race Theory
and Political Lawyering Practice in Post-Civil Rights America, 95 MIcH. L. REv. 821,
860 (1997) (examining the Court's "color-blind" voting rights jurisprudence beyond the
context of the black-white paradigm).
,. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Board of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483 (1954); see Rodney A. Smolla, The Ghosts of Homer Plessy, 12 GA. ST.
U. L REV. 1037, 1052-53 (1996) (arguing that Justice Harlan's ideal of abolishing race-
conscious policies is gaining support in the current Supreme Court).
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no superior, dominant ruling class of citizens. There is no
caste here. Our Constitution is color-blind [and under the
majority's holding] there would remain a power in the
States, by sinister legislation, to interfere with the full
enjoyment of the blessing of liberty; to regulate civil rights,
common to all citizens, upon the basis of race; and to
place in a condition of legal inferiority a large body of
American citizens.
3 4
For Justice Harlan, a "color blind" Constitution did not permit
unequal application of the laws. However, Justice Bradley's Plessy
majority and their spiritual heirs, the Rehnquist-Scalia majority
today, have appropriated the phrase, using it to strike down civil
rights legislation and leave "equality" to the forces of social Dar-
winism. Under this view, minorities are seen as having all the
rights of other citizens, able to move forward on their own without
protection from Congress or the courts. 3 ' The Burger and
Rehnquist Courts have veered sharply from the original intent of
the Fourteenth Amendment, 136 embarking on a jurisprudence that
could more aptly be called "blind" rather than "color blind."'
37
'3 Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559, 563, quoted in ASHMORE, supra note 118, at 343 (1994).
13S. See id. at 343-44.
'3 See Jeanmarie K. Grubert, Note, The Rehnquist Court's Changed Reading of the
Equal Protection Clause in the Context of Voting Rights, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1819
(1997) (questioning the Court's tendency to recognize an Equal Protection violation any-
time that race is found to be a predominant factor in the creation of voting districts).
137. With the Reagan-Bush era, the United States moved headlong toward what has
been called "the revival of anti-civil rights sentiment," which came to be expressed in
terms of the code words "color blindness," or "[t]he idea that standing in society depend-
ed on moral and intellectual fitness[, which] was particularly gratifying for those who had
risen from humble beginnings." ASHmORE, supra note 118, at 344. In this sense, it is
interesting to note that in practice and on the Court, Justice Rehnquist opposed desegrega-
tion of schools and public accommodations. See id. Dissenting in Rome v. United States,
Justice Rehnquist argued against race-conscious remedies for racial discrimination. See
Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 214 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote in 1979: "My father came to this country when he was
a teenager. Not only had he never profited from the sweat of any black man's brow, I
don't think he had ever seen a black man." Antonin Scalia, The Disease as Cure: "In
Order to Get Beyond Racism, We Must First Take Account of Race", 47 WASH. U. L.Q.
147, 152 (1979). Justice Scalia works from this image of the "innocent" white to the idea
that discrimination, if it exists, is intentional wrongdoing by specific wrongdoers, and that
"innocent" beneficiaries of unfair systems owe nothing to the victims. See Thomas Ross,
Innocence and Affirmative Action, 43 VAN. L. REV. 297, 298 (1990) (exploring the
"innocent white victim" argument). But see T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-
Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1060 (1991) (arguing against color-blindness as a
judicial position). He therefore draws no distinctions between race-conscious remedies for
inequalities of opportunity caused by racial discrimination and the invidious use of race-
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1. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.
One of the most disturbing examples of the Rehnquist Court's
"color blind" reading of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protec-
tion Clause is City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co., 138 in which
Justice O'Connor's plurality found that all governmental programs
establishing race-based preferences are inherently suspect and sub-
ject to strict scrutiny because of the near-impossibility of distin-
guishing between benign remedial classifications on the one hand,
and classifications based on "illegitimate notions of racial inferiori-
ty or simple racial politics. ' 139 Justice O'Connor added that racial
classifications may stigmatize those whom the classification was
supposed to help,"4 and expressed concern that affirmative action
plans may reinforce stereotypes that the subjects of the plan are
unable to succeed without special protection.1 4' Finally, she re-
jected a lesser standard of review for remedial race-based classifi-
cations on the grounds that society would never reach equality
unless all race-based classifications are strictly scrutinized. 142 There-
fore, she said, a "watered-down" application of equal protection
review "effectively assured that race will always be relevant in
American life."'
143
Justice O'Connor, frequently the swing vote in 5-4 voting
rights decisions, followed the conservative line on this issue. Al-
though Croson did not address voting issues, it is a pivotal case in
the evolution of the Rehnquist Court's "color-blind" rationale. Be-
fore Croson, the Court usually reserved strict scrutiny analysis for
laws disadvantaging groups that had historically been subjected to
discrimination. Croson was the first case in which the Supreme
based discrimination to deny equal opportunities to minorities. See, e.g., Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 527 (1989) (Scalia, L, concurring).
"" 488 U.S. 469 (1989). In Croson, a white contractor challenged the city of
Richmond's "Minority Business Enterprise" (MBE) ordinance requiring all contractors
receiving city contracts to award at least thirty percent of the sub-contracted work to one
or more MBEs. See id. at 477. The contractor argued that the set-aside violated the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. See id. at 469.
,9. ld. at 493 (explaining that while the city's ordinance empowers minorities, it does
so at the expense of non-minorities who are precluded from competing for contracts based
upon their race).
"" See id. at 493.
141- See id. at 493-94 (citing University of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 298
(1978)).
'" See Id. at 493.
'I Id. at 495 (criticizing race-based government policies even where they are imple-
mented for remedial purposes).
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Court held that any race-based state action is subject to strict scru-
tiny regardless of whether the targeted racial group benefits or
suffers by the classification. Although this reasoning has been
derided as equating a welcome mat with a keep out sign, it has
become the core of the present Court's "color blind" jurisprudence
and has led to the engrafting of the judge-made requirement of
intentional wrongdoing before the court will find a violation of
equal protection.
Concurring in City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co, Justice
Scalia set out the conservative manifesto of non-intervention to
remedy race-based discrimination, saying, "In my view there is
only one circumstance in which the States may act by race to
'undo the effects of past discrimination': where that is necessary to
eliminate their own maintenance of a system of unlawful racial
classification.'" "When we depart from this American principle
we play with fire, and much more than an occasional DeFunis,
Johnson, or Croson bums."'" In evoking this image, Justice
Scalia comes dangerously close to suggesting that resort to mob
violence is justifiable when an "American principle" is violated.
Characterizing this implied threat of violence as "an American
principle" does nothing to justify it on constitutional grounds."
As Professor Gotanda points out, Justice Scalia is not invoking a
neutral constitutional principle; rather, he is advocating the policy
view that the costs of providing remedies to African-Americans and
women may be more than white American men are willing to bear,
and it is simply bootstrapping on Justice Scalia's part to iy to
pass a statement of racial policy off as a constitutional princi-
ple.147 The conservative Court majority thus took a major step
toward undercutting gains minority voters had made in the past
century, all but eliminating equal protection by refusing to inter-
vene on behalf of a disenfranchised minority population unless
each member could show personal, intentional discrimination.'"
Dissenting in a later case, Justice Blackmun again decried the
Court's Croson decision, saying, "One wonders whether the majori-
ty still believes that race discrimination-or, more accurately, race
discrimination against nonwhites-is a problem in our society, or
Id. at 524 (Scalla, J., concurring).
" Id. at 527 (Scalia, J., concurring).
'" See Thomas Ross, The Richmond Narratives, 68 TEX. L. REv. 381 (1989).
147. See Gotanda, supra note 110, at 47.
"" See id. at 2-3.
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even remembers that it ever was.' 49
2. Whitcomb v. Chavis
In Whitcomb v. Chavis,150 six plaintiffs brought a Fourteenth
Amendment challenge to an Indiana system of multi-member
districting which they alleged diluted the African-American vote in
Marion County, Indiana.' 5' The plaintiffs alleged that the
districting scheme made possible "serial voting that, in the context
of a majority voting bloc, will reward a cohesive majority with
superordinate representation,"' 52 by permitting each voter "to vote
separately on each candidate for office, thereby allowing a voting
majority to control every seat in an election."' 3 The Whitcomb
plaintiffs also challenged the constitutionality of multi-member
districting in general.'54
The Court refused to hold multi-member districting unconstitu-
tional per se." While it recognized that such systems can dimin-
ish the value of a group's votes within the dominant voting popu-
lation, the Court required the plaintiffs to prove that in their situa-
tion, multi-member districting diluted the quality of representation
when compared with single-member districting. 56 The Court rec-
ognized that a minority community's rights are violated if its vot-
ing strength is submerged by the multi-member district,"5' but
found insufficient evidence of minority vote dilution because the
plaintiffs had "equal opportunity to participate in and influence the
selection of candidates and legislators. .. ."'5' Justice White
seemed to confuse lack of participation, i.e., exclusion of individu-
als from casting their ballot, with minority vote dilution, i.e., ren-
149. Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 662 (1989) (Blackmum, J.,
dissenting) (citing with disapproval Croson).
"0- 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
,"'. See id. at 128-29. Marion County, Indiana, and the City of Indianapolis form a
consolidated city-county with a unitary government.
"2- Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the Political Process: The Transformation
of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 90 MIcH. L. REV. 1833, 1840 (1992).
53- T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Samuel Issacharoff, Race and Redistricting: Drawing
Constitutional Lines after Shaw v. Reno, 92 McH. L. REv. 588, 590 (1993).
'4 See Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 144 (restating voters' claim that multi-member districts
have "unconstitutional advantages" over small districts or single-member votes).
155 See id. at 147 (refusing to recognize voters' charge that multi-member districts
overrepresent their voters).
1. See id.
's. See Mary A. Inman, Comment, C.P.R. (Change through Proportional Representa-
tion): Resuscitating a Federal Electoral System, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1991, 1993 (1993).
"'- See Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 153.
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dering the casting of ballots by minority voters nugatory by sub-
merging them in districts of conflicting interests. This is made
clear by his implication that plaintiffs could help to support their
dilution claim with proof that African-Americans were unable to
register, vote, or choose their political party, or that ghetto resi-
dents were "regularly excluded from the slates of both major par-
ties."'5 What this has to do with proof "that multimember dis-
tricts are being used invidiously to cancel out or minimize the
voting strength of racial groups" was never explained. 6"
Whitcomb therefore reinforces the impression that the Court will
enforce voting rights only in terms of a pro forma right to engage
in the ritual of the ballot box. However, if the concept of a "right
to vote" is to mean anything, it must be understood to include the
right to influence outcomes in a significant way.
3. City of Mobile v. Bolden
If the quest for equality of voting rights is viewed as a cycle,
Justice Stewart's plurality opinion in City of Mobile v. Bolden,161
requiring plaintiffs to prove invidious purpose," is undoubtedly
an indication of a downturn toward the Plessy Court's acceptance
of de jure exclusion. The Bolden plaintiffs were a group of black
voters from Mobile who alleged that the city's at-large voting
system unfairly diluted the votes of a large, geographically and
politically distinctive minority group, and that racially polarized
bloc voting by the white majority consistently defeated minority-
preferred candidates. 6
Justice Stewart's plurality opinion rejecting plaintiffs' position
markedly restricted the protection of the Fifteenth Amendment right
to vote, reading it as guaranteeing no more than the right to partic-
ipate, i.e., to cast a vote."6 As in Whitcomb, the African-Ameri-
,59. Id. at 149-50.
'60. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765-66 (1973) (citing Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at
141-48).
161. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
'62 Id at 73-74 (requiring that claimants demonstrate a "discriminatory intent" in order
for a voting system to be invalidated).
'63" See id. at 58 (noting that at-large voting system is followed by thousands of local
governments throughout the country).
'64. See id. at 64-65 ("The Fifteenth Amendment does not entail the right to have a
Negro candidate elected.... The Amendment prohibits only purposefully discriminatory
denial or abridgement by government of the freedom to vote 'on account of race, color,
or previous condition of servitude.'").
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can plaintiffs were able to register and cast their votes "without
hindrance." The Stewart plurality found that their Fifteenth Amend-
ment right to vote was not implicated by the consistent defeat of
minority-preferred candidates, which is consistent with Stewart's
view that Congress cannot constitutionally take race into account,
even to remedy the results of past illegal discrimination."65 Addi-
tionally, the plurality ruled that unless plaintiffs can prove inten-
tional discrimination, they have no claim. 66 Thus, Bolden unam-
biguously established invidious purpose not only as the standard
for Fifteenth Amendment claims, but also for claims under § 2 of
the Voting Rights Act. Plaintiffs must now prove that the chal-
lenged multi-member district plan was "conceived or operated as
[a] purposeful devic[e] to further racial discrimination."1 67
Despite Alabama's appalling history of intentional minority
disenfranchisement, the Court also ruled that it is not enough to
show that minority voting strength was diluted: Plaintiffs must
show that the majority intentionally caused this exclusion. Although
the Bolden plaintiffs were able to meet this standard upon retrial in
district court, it is nevertheless true that by requiring plaintiffs to
prove intentional discrimination in order to establish a violation of
the Voting Rights Act's vote-dilution provisions, the Bolden Court
departed from a long line of contrary holdings,s and greatly in-
creased the burden on the disenfranchised.169 With Bolden, it thus
became all but impossible to challenge multimember districts unless
'" See Minnick v. California Dep't of Corrections, 452 U.S. 105, 128-29 (1981)
(Stewart, J., dissenting) ("'B]y making race a relevant criterion... the Government ir-
plicitly teaches the public that the apportionment of rewards and penalties can legitimately
be made according to race--rather than according to merit or accountability.. .
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 525 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
"' See Bolden, 446 U.S. at 64-65 (stating that purposeful discrimination is the finch-
pin requirement for a voter's rights claim under the Fourteenth Amendment); See also
NIEMAN, supra note 13, at 215.
'67- Bolden, 446 U.S. at 65-66 (quoting Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149
(1971)) (reiterating the "purposefulness" requirement for attacking a racially disproportional
electoral system).
t8 See, e.g., Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407 (1977); Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1
(1975); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973); Bums v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73
(1966); Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965). While Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S.
124 (1971) and Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964), had seemed to suggest an
intent requirement, it was not until Bolden that the Court raised this factor to the level of
an absolute requirement. Congress amended the Voting Rights Act in 1982, Voting Rights
Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 2, 96 Stat. 131 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973
(1982)), to re-establish the earlier results test.
'6. See NIEMAN, supra note 13, at 215 (noting that it took plaintiffs nearly two years
after remand to establish proof of discriminatory intent).
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the defendants were considerate enough to provide evidence that
the plan for multimember districts was "conceived or operated" for
such a use. 170 The addition of this intent requirement was a crip-
pling blow to minority voting rights, since the odds of finding
proof that a particular voting practice was adopted for the express
purpose of discriminating against minorities have aptly been com-
pared with the odds of finding the Holy Grail.
171
As Justice Marshall bitterly noted in his dissent, the Stewart
plurality's vision of the Fifteenth Amendment's "right to vote
provide[d] the politically powerless with nothing more than the
right to cast meaningless ballots.' ' 172 He warned that the Court
"cannot expect the victims of discrimination to respect political
channels of seeking redress"'73 if they are unable to receive ade-
quate representation due to the Court's stringent discriminatory
standard of proof for a claim of minority vote dilution, 174 and
predicted that the "superficial tranquility" created by the Bolden
decision would be "short-lived."' 175
4. Hunter v. Underwood.76
Meanwhile, in Alabama, little had changed. The disenfranchis-
ing provisions of the Alabama Constitution retained the bar to
voting for anyone convicted of any offense "involving moral turpi-
tude," leaving it up to the registrars to interpret this prohibi-
tion.'" The plaintiffs had been barred from voting in Montgom-
ery and Jefferson Counties because of "nonprison" misdemeanor
""- Bolden, 446 U.S. at 65-66; see also Inman, supra note 157, at 2038 (remarking
that proving the subjective intentions of racist legislators is the "legal equivalent of find-
ing the Holy Grail").
'7. See Inman, supra note 157, at 2038 (noting that the Court never provided guidance
as to what would constitute sufficient evidence for a successful claim against a discrimi-
natory electoral system).
""2 Bolden, 446 U.S. at 104 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see Pamela S. Karlan, Undoing
the Right Thing: Single-Member Offices and the Voting Rights Act, 77 VA. L. REv. 1, 39
(1991) (stating that the Voting Rights Act was designed to "bring about a radical realign-
ment of political control').
171. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 141 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
'1 See id. (attacking the stringent "intentional discrimination" standard of proof for
voters challenging an electoral system).
'75. Id. (cautioning the Court that its failure in Bolden to nullify that discrimination
would cause victims of discrimination to lose their respect for political channels of re-
dress).
176 471 U.S. 222 (1985).
'77. Id. at 223-24.
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check fraud convictions,'78 which Alabama had designated as
crimes of "moral turpitude.' ,7 9 The plaintiffs alleged that the dis-
enfranchising provisions of section 182 of the Alabama Constitu-
tion had been adopted for the express purpose,8 and had the ex-
press effect, of disproportionately disenfranchising blacks,'8 ' a
contention which the Court found to be true, based on what Justice
Rehnquist termed substantial evidence.8 2
The Court first addressed the plaintiffs' contention that section
182 was unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause, given Alabama's long-standing and well-docu-
mented history of intentional direct and indirect exclusion of mi-
nority voters."' The Court noted that "proving the motivation be-
hind official action is often.., problematic,"'8 4 but found that
the plaintiffs had done so. The Court refused to address the issue
of whether "intentional disenfranchisement of poor whites would
qualify as a 'permissible motive, '85 saying:
[I]t is clear that where both impermissible motivation and
racially discriminatory impact are demonstrated, Arlington
Heights and Mt. Healthy supply the proper analysis....
[A]n additional purpose to discriminate against poor whites
would not render nugatory the purpose to discriminate
against all blacks, and it is beyond peradventure that the
latter was a "but-for" motivation for the enactment of §
182186
Underwood made clear that a showing of intentional discrimi-
nation is the sine qua non of an equal protection claim, under
standards derived from the Court's housing discrimination jurispru-
t79 I. at 224.
17. M.; see also ALA. CONST. art. 8, § 182.
'a See Underwood v. Hunter, 730 F.2d 614 (lth Cir. 1984), affid, 471 U.S. 222
(1985) (finding that discriminatory intent motivated adoption of this section; therefore it
violates on account of race the fourteenth amendment as to those convicted of crimes not
punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary); see also Shapiro, supra note 35, at 547-
48 (discussing the Court's "other crime" analysis in the context of felon disenfranchise-
ment); cf Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (invalidating inter-district busing
where there was no showing of an inter-district violation).
IS,. See Underwood v. Hunter, 730 F.2d at 616.
t6. See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. at 227-31.
8. See id. at 222, 226-27, 229 (citing to testimony of historians, and citing as author-
itative WOODWARD, supra note 41, at 321-22 (1971)).
Id. at 228.
. Id. at 232.
' I'/
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dence.1" The Court briefly addressed the question of whether fel-
on disenfranchisement was "excepted from the operation of the
Equal Protection Clause of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment by
the 'other crime' provision of § 2.. ., 8 Declining to revisit
the issue decided in Ramirez, the Court said, "[W]e are confident
that § 2 was not designed to permit the purposeful racial discrimi-
nation attending the enactment and operation" of the Alabama
disenfranchising provision, which the Court said otherwise violates
equal protection."9 Thus, while ruling for the plaintiffs and strik-
ing down the challenged law, Underwood still serves to limit a
plaintiff's case in any suit challenging franchise stratagems for
which evidence of intent is not so readily available.
III. COMPLETING THE CYCLE: THE DEATH OF VOTING RIGHTS
"The Negro as a political force has dropped out of con-
sideration ..
Henry W. Grady' 90
Justice O'Connor referred to Shaw v. Reno as involving "the
meaning of the Constitutional 'right' to vote,"' and perhaps this
seemingly simple statement holds the key to present treatment of
voting rights jurisprudence. Justice O'Connor's inverted commas
around the word "right" suggest two possible interpretations, both
disturbing. One possibility is that in her view, the right to vote is
not a right at all, but merely a "right."'" Nearly as troubling is
the alternate interpretation, that the right to vote takes only a single
form, which in the Court's current jurisprudence seems limited to
187- See id. at 227-28 (quoting Arlington Heights v. Metro Housing Development Corp.,
429 U.S. 252, 264-65 (1977)).
'm Id. at 233.
" Id. (citing 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
190- HENRY W. GRADY, TiE NEw SouTH 244 (New York, R. Bonner's Sons 1890).
Professor Franklin commented that, "In his claim regarding the ineffectiveness of the Ne-
gro as a political force Grady was literally vishing the Negro 'as a political force' out of
the picture." Franklin, supra note 5, at 241 n.1.
"'* Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 633 (1993).
192 See Karlan, supra note 17, at 1709 & n.13; see also James A Gardner, Liberty,
Conununity and the Constitutional Structure of Political Influence: A Reconsideration of
the Right to Vote, 45 U. PA. L REv. 893, 933 (1997) (describing the Court's recent cases
as demonstrating increasing hostility toward § 2 of the Voting Rights Act "because that
provision implemented a protective-democracy solution to a problem that the Court defines
as communitarian").
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the mere right to participate in the voting process, i.e., to cast a
ballot, and to have that ballot counted,193 without consideration of
the diluting effects of majority bloc voting.
A. The Crackdown on Minorities: Disproportionate Minority
Incarceration as Vote Dilution
Felony disenfranchisement laws still remain in many states,
effectively blocking access to the polls for minority groups in those
states. Trends in criminal prosecutions in the waning decades of
the twentieth century have led to greater and greater percentages of
the minority population being incarcerated.'94 Of a total voting
age population of 10.4 million black men in the United States,
approximately 1.46 million have been disqualified from voting
because of a felony conviction. 95 Of these, 950,000 are in pris-
on, on probation, or parole, and more than 500,000 are permanent-
ly barred by convictions in the 13 states that disenfranchise prison-
ers for life.'96 The United States is among the world's most ac-
tive nations in imprisoning its citizens,197 and the racial disparity
in rates of incarceration is growing. In Baltimore, more than half
of all black men in their twenties are in prison, on probation, or
on parole, and in the District of Columbia, the figure is approxi-
mately 40%. 19
8
The 1997 Sentencing Project report found that by 1994 the
193. See Karlan, supra note 17, at 1709-10 & n.13.
'9 See Andrew Hacker, Malign Neglect: The Crackdown on African-Americans, NA-
TION, July 10, 1995, at 45, 46 ("Like welfare, crime has been given a racial coloration.
Indeed, "black crime" is regarded as different and more fearsome than other forms of
lawbreaking.). Current statistics are available at The Sentencing Project, New Report:
Americans Behind Bars (visited Mar. 31, 1998) <http://www.sprojectcom/press-l.htm>
(copy on file with the Case Western Reserve Law Review).
'". See Butterfield, supra note 40, at A12.
1K See iL ("Felons are prohibited from voting while in prison in 46 states, and 31 of
them disenfranchise offenders while they are on probation or parole."). See also infra
Appendix B for states which do not disenfranchise or. which make restoration of rights
automatic or relatively simple. The states that disenfranchise permanently or which make
restoration of rights difficult are set out infra Appendix A. See also infra Appendix C for
state-by-state summary of disenfranchising provisions. For a detailed analysis of state
restrictions on voting rights, see Note, The Equal Protection Clause As A Limitation on
the States' Power to Disfranchise Those Convicted of a Crime, 21 RUTGERS L REv. 297-
98 & nn. 14-18 (1967) (collecting statutes); see also Harvey, supra note 3, at 1146-49
(analyzing continuing impact of disenfranchisement provisions).
197. See Hacker, supra note 194, at 46 ("Black men occupy more than half the nation's
cells, and each year finds them accounting for more of the prison population").
'f See id. at 48.
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disparity in incarceration rates between blacks and whites had risen
to a ratio of 7.66 blacks for every white in prisons, up from 6.88
in 1988.99 The so-called "war on drugs," with its law-and-order
approach has been aptly described as "crackdown on African
Americans,"2 °° and it has been a primary cause in recent years of
the incarceration of citizens of color in numbers far exceeding their
percentage of the population. 1 African-Americans make up 51%
of the 1.1 million inmates in prison, although they only represent
14% of the nation's population.2" Implementation of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines in 1987 has resulted in a radical shift in the
racial balance of those sentenced for crime: before the guidelines,
whites were 66.3% of those sentenced, African-Americans were
22.3% and Latinos were 8.5%.3 After the Guidelines took ef-
fect, whites dropped to 44.5% of those sentenced, while African-
Americans and Latinos increased dramatically, to 26.2% and 26.3%
respectively.2' In the 18 to 25 year old age group, the disparities
are even more startling: white males sentenced in that age group
dropped from 56% immediately before implementation of the
Guidelines to 39.2% after;, African-Americans increased from
27.6% to 29.2%; and Latinos sentenced almost tripled, from 12.4%
before to 31.6% after Guidelines implementation.2 °5
This imbalance in incarceration rates cannot be attributed to a
disproportionate predilection for crime by minority populations:
". See Butterfield, supra note 40, at A12. In its report Americans Behind Bars: A
Comparison of International Rates of Incarceration, 1995, The Sentencing Project notes
that the United States now has the highest recorded rate of incarceration of any nation in
the world, surpassing both South Africa and the former Soviet Union. See The Sentencing
Project, supra note 194; see also Hacker, supra note 194, at 47 (noting reasons why poor
blacks committing crimes are more likely to get caught than white or blue-collar crimi-
nals).
2=. Butterfield, supra note 40, at A12 (citing Sentencing Project Study, Intended and
Unintended Consequences: State Racial Disparities in Imprisonment). For specific state
information, see infra Appendices A-C.
2" See Butterfield, supra note 40, at A12 (citing Sentencing Project Study, Intended
and Unintended Consequences: State Racial Disparities in Imprisonment); see also Harvey,
supra note 3, at 1152 tbl.1, 1151-59. (providing statistics and statistical analysis); id at
1158 ("44% of black convicted felons are sent to prison, compared to 33% of convicted
white felons.").
m See Butterfield, supra note 40, at A-12 (citing Sentencing Project Study, Intended
and Unintended Consequences: State Racial Disparities in Imprisonment). For specific
state information, see infra Appendices A-C.
203. See Gerald W. Heaney, The Reality of Guidelines Sentencing: No End to Disparity,
28 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 161, 204 & 204 tbl.5 (1991).
214 See id.
m- See id. at 205 & 205 tbl.6.
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93% of those convicted of drug offenses in New York State are
black or Latino and only 6.3% white, despite the fact that "[situd-
ies and experience have shown that most people who use and sell
drugs in [New York] and the nation are white."2 93% of the
United States African American population is located in 22 states,
primarily New York, California, and those states in the South and
Midwest, all of which disenfranchise those convicted of various
offenses.'
Some states that disenfranchise for various offenses restore the
vote once the person has completed the sentence," 8 but most put
varying degrees of obstacles in the way of ex-prisoners seeking
reinstatement of their voting rights.0 9 In some states, persons
once convicted are disenfranchised for life unless they seek and
obtain a full pardons or similar extraordinary restoration of their
voting rights.2 ° This stark reality necessarily depletes a minority
community's voting strength over time by consistently placing a
greater proportion of minority than majority voters under a voting
disability at any given time21 For this reason, the effects of the
intentional discrimination that originally motivated felon disenfran-
chisement still linger. There are, of course, some states where felon
disenfranchisement was not adopted for discriminatory reasons, but
there, too, it operates with discriminatory effect. Testifying before
the House Judiciary Subcommittee at a hearing on voting rights of
former prisoners in 1974, John A. Buggs, the Director of the Unit-
ed States Commission on Civil Rights pointed out that, looking at
the relative conviction rates for whites and nonwhites, "one gets a
rather shocking idea of how disfranchising prohibitions based on
felony convictions affect minorities." 2" Director Buggs added that
206 Shapiro, supra note 35, at 557 n.1 12 (citing The Correctional Association of New
York, Mandatory Sentencing Laws and Drug Offenders in New York State (Feb. 1993)
(citing figures from the New York State Department of Correctional Services, the National
Institute on Drug Abuse, and the Legal Action Center)).
2" See Butterfield, supra note 40, at A12 (citing Sentencing Project Study, Intended
and Unintended Consequences: State Racial Disparities in Imprisonment). See infra Ap-
pendices A-C for specific state information.
20 See infra Appendices A-C for specific state information.
20" See infra Appendices A-C for specific state information.
210. See Shapiro, supra note 35, at 538-39 & nn.15-16 (collecting statutes). For a more
detailed description of state disenfranchising provisions, see infra Appendices A-C.
211. See Butterfield, supra note 40, at A12 (citing Sentencing Project Study, Intended
and Unintended Consequences: State Racial Disparities in Imprisonment).
212 Voting Rights Hearings, supra note 39, at 12. Some states disenfranchised even
misdemeanants. See, e.g., Anderson v. State, 72 Ala. 187 (1882) (holding that under dis-
enfranchisement provisions of Alabama's constitution, art. 8, § 3, a conviction of either
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"even in those States where the lists of disqualifying crimes were
not selected with the purpose of disfranchising blacks [the felon
disenfranchisement laws] established an invidious racial discrimina-
tion against minority citizens."213
B. Richardson v. Ramirez
Curiously, section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment2 14 has not
been applied against states that disenfranchised the freedmen after
passage of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 5  In Richardson v.
Ramirez,16 three parolees brought an equal-protection challenge
to a California law which had disenfranchised them because of
their convictions of "infamous crime[s]. 2t 7 The California Su-
preme Court held that the law violated equal protection, 218  but
grand or petit larceny disqualifies a citizen from voting). In addition to losing the right to
vote, a convicted felon may be deprived of employment opportunities, professional licens-
es, and the right to hold office and sit on a jury. See, e.g., IDAHO CONST. art. VI, § 3
(disqualifying a person convicted of a felony or "confined in prison on conviction of a
criminal offense" from voting, serving as a juror, or holding any civil office); Williams v.
Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898) (upholding Mississippi law that disqualified from jury
service anyone disqualified from voting).
213. Voting Rights Hearings, supra note 39, at 13.
214. Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides:
[W]hen the right to vote . . . is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such
State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in
any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis
of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number
of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens
twenty-one years of age in such State.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
215. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. See GRoss, supra note 52, at 222:
[B]y 1900, Mississippi, Louisiana, South Carolina, and North Carolina had dis-
franchised the Negro through an assortment of devious legal devices, many of
which were adopted by Alabama in the Constitution of 1901. Representation in
Congress from these states had not been denied or reduced, as provided for in
the Fourteenth amendment.
216. 418 U.S. 24 (1974). Ramirez followed closely on the heels of Fincher v. Scott,
352 F. Supp. 117, 119 (M.D.N.C. 1972), affd, 411 U.S. 961 (1973) (stating that North
Carolina may constitutionally continue "historic exclusion" of felons from the franchise
without regard to whether such exclusion can pass muster under the equal protection
clause). Cf. Allen v. Ellisor, 664 F.2d 391 (4th Cir. 1981) (stating that South Carolina
statute disqualifying persons convicted of selected crimes does not violate equal protection
on its face, and remanding for consideration of plaintiff's claim that the statute was ra-
cially discriminatory, and vacated and remanded the underlying statute was amended),
vacated, 454 U.S. 807 (1981).
217. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. at 26-27.
218. Ramirez v. Brown, 507 P.2d 1345, 1357 (1974), rev'd sub nom. Richardson v.
Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
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the United States Supreme Court reversed.21 9 The Ramirez major-
ity held that because the framers of the fourteenth amendment's
section 2 excepted "participation in a rebellion or other crime"
from the provision reducing representation for seceding states that
denied blacks the right to vote, disenfranchisement based on a
state-law conviction must not be a per se section 1 equal protec-
tion violation. The Court said:
[1In dealing with voting rights as it does, [§ 1 of the equal
protection clause] could not have been meant to bar out-
right a form of disenfranchisement which was expressly
exempted from the less drastic sanction of reduced repre-
sentation which § 2 imposed for other forms of disenfran-
chisement.22'
Therefore, a divided Court held, laws disenfranchising convicts
were not subject to the strict scrutiny normally applied to voting
restrictions.' As Professor David Shapiro has noted:
The Court expressly disavowed the argument rejected in
Reynolds v. Sims that section two is the only part of the
fourteenth amendment dealing with voting rights. Nor did it
suggest that a state law relating to voting rights is neces-
sarily valid under the equal protection clause if it imposes
a restriction widespread at the time the clause was adopt-
ed .... The sole basis of the decision was that the explicit
exemption from the formula in section two precludes judi-
cial invalidation under the equal protection clause of sec-
tion one2o
Justice Marshall, joined in dissent by Justice Brennan, said that
the majority's holding was based on an "unsound historical analysis
which already has been rejected by this Court," 4 and predicted
that the Court's holding could lead to disenfranchisement for "se-
duction under promise of marriage, or conspiracy to operate a
motor vehicle without a muffler ... or breaking a water pipe in
219. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974). •
' Ramirez v. Brown, 507 P.2d at 1347.
22" Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. at 55.
227 See id.
2a David L. Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 HARV. L. REV.
293, 303 (1976) (citations omitted). Professor Shapiro strongly criticizes the Rehnquist
analysis in Richardson v. Ramirez. See id at 302-04.
224, Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. at 56 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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North Dakota, [or e]ven a jaywalking or traffic convic-
tion.... ." After a detailed analysis of the Court's equal pro-
tection jurisprudence in analyzing state statutes that "selectively dis-
tribute the franchise," Justice Marshall concluded that because
voting is a fundamental right, "the Court must determine whether
the exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling state inter-
est." 7 He concluded that the state had not met its burden.'
The Ramirez Court left open the possibility of an equal protec-
tion challenge against disqualifications that are too broadly or
vaguely defined, such as "crimes of moral turpitude" or the like. In
such cases, or in cases in which there is no rational basis for se-
lection of the disqualifying felonies, or where the law is inconsis-
tently applied, the Court suggested that it would find an equal
protection violation in "such a total lack of uniformity," 9  but
there is no indication of what set of circumstances would meet this
test.
Of course, many non-racial motives have been advanced for
felon disenfranchisement including the so-called "purity of the
ballot box," '  with the loss of the franchise treated as a badge
of infamy, indicating the "other" who is unworthy of the rights of
a citizen." Judge Leon Bazile, typified the view that sees the
ex-felon and people of color as partaking of "otherness" or outsider
m- Id. at 76 n.24 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Otsuka v. Hite, 414 P.2d 412
(1966); Gary L. Reback, Note, Disenfranchisement of Ex-felons: A Reassessment, 25 STAN.
L. REV. 845, 845-46 (1973) (collecting statutes); id. at 850 (arguing that disenfranchise-
ment of ex-felons violates equal protection)); see also Harvey, supra note 3, at 1161-64
(discussing Reback's foreshadowing of Marshall's dissent).
226 Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. at 77 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 78 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
22aI
22 Id. at 56 (remanding to state trial court for factual determination).
230. This catch-phrase apparently first appeared in a Reconstruction-era Alabama case
challenging felon disenfranchisement, see Washington v. State, 75 Ala. 582 (1884), but it
has persisted into recent years. See Dillenburg v. Kramer, 469 F.2d 1222, 1224 (9th Cir.
1972):
Courts have been hard pressed to define the state interest served by [felon
disenfranchisement] laws. . . .Search for modem reasons to sustain old govern-
mental disenfranchisement prerogative has usually ended with a general pro-
nouncement that a state has an interest in preventing persons who have been
convicted of serious crimes from participating in the electoral process or a
quasi-metaphysical invocation that the interest is preservation of the "purity of
the ballot box."
231 Washington v. State, 75 Ala. at 585 (holding that one rendered infamous by con-
viction of base offense indicative of great moral turpitude is unfit to exercise the privilege
of suffrage).
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status in Loving v. Virginia, when he said:
Parties [to an interracial marriage are] guilty of a most
serious crime.... Almighty God created the races, white,
black, yellow, malay, and red, and he placed them on sepa-
rate continents.... The fact that he separated the races
shows that he did not intend for the races to mix. The
awfulness of the offense [of interracial marriage] is shown
by the fact... [that] the code makes the contracting of a
marriage between a white person and any colored person a
felony. Conviction of a felony is a serious matter. You lose
your political rights, and only the government has the
power to restore them. And as long as you live you will
be known as a felon. "The moving finger writes and moves
on and having writ / Nor all your piety nor all your wit /
Can change one line of it."'2
The unsavory facts are that present day felon disenfranchise-
ment has its roots in a mentality that assigned people of color to
the status of non-person, and that these laws continue to operate
with discriminatory effect. The right to vote is so fundamental to
our democratic system of government that the denial to any group
of citizens of the right to vote should raise concerns over the
system's integrity, especially when that right is disproportionately
denied to minority voters in a continuation of historic, intentional
disenfranchisement. Unfortunately, with the Supreme Court's recent
views of equal protection challenges to vote-dilution vehicles, it is
unlikely that such unfair laws will face invalidation in the near
future.
C. "Compactness" and the "Ghetto" Requirement
Another disturbing trend in the Court's "color blind"
constitutionalism is the Court's requirement-explicit in some cas-
es, and implicit in others-that before a minority community is
entitled to representation, minority members must live in geographi-
cally "compact" districts which can be justified on "traditional"
distracting principles. In other words, to establish a § 2 violation,
m Transcript of Record at 8, reproduced in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I app. at
42 (1967) (the Judge's name is given in the Appendix at 33). Legal historian Paul
Fimkelman has observed that "since colonial times the legal system has seen color itself
as a sign of criminality." Paul Finkelman, The Crime of Color, 67 TtL L. REv. 2063,
2064 (1993).
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plaintiffs must prove that "the minority group... is sufficient-
ly... geographically compact... [so that they can form a] ma-
jority-minority district. 's3 The paradox, of course, is that the
"traditional" principles resulted in the systematic defeat of minori-
ty-preferred candidates in the jurisdictions subject to the Voting
Rights Act.
1. Thornburg v. Gingles
In Thornburg v. Gingles '2 4 a vote-dilution case that originat-
ed in North Carolina, the Court established that while race-based
vote dilution violated the "results" test, plaintiffs could only obtain
a remedy against the majority's racially-polarized bloc voting if the
minority plaintiffs can prove that they live in a geographically
"compact" area. Justice O'Connor stated plainly: "[Ellectoral suc-
cess has now emerged, under the Court's standard, as the linchpin
of vote dilution claims, and ... the elements of a vote dilution
claim... create an entitlement to roughly proportional representa-
tion within the framework of single-member districts. ' ss5
The Gingles plaintiffs challenged the use of at-large elections
in multi-member districts in North Carolina's state elections, even
though the plan had been "precleared" by the Justice Department.
The plaintiffs argued that the multi-member districts, from which
candidates were elected at large (rather than each running from a
separate district) diluted their votes by submerging them in a white
majority.3 6 The Court found that the challenged practice of at-
large voting in multi-member districts in which the white majority
. Pamela S. Karlan, Maps and Misreadings: The Role of Geographic Compactness in
Racial Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 173, 180 (1989); see also
Kathfryn Abrams, "Raising Politics Up": Minority Political Participation and Section 2 of
the Voting Rights Act, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 449, 476-77 (1988) (considering voting as a
means of expression and interaction with fellow citizens); Ronald Dworldn, What Is
Equality? Part 4: Political Equality, 22 U.S.F. L. REv. 1, 4 (1987) (arguing that by giv-
ing an individual the right to vote, "(the community confirms an individual person's
membership, as a free and equal citizen").
234. 478 U.S. 30, 43 (1986):
While explaining that "lt]he extent to which members of a protected class have
been elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance
which may be considered" in evaluating an alleged violation, §2(b) cautions
that "nothing in [§2] establishes a right to have members of a protected class
elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population."
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b)) (alterations in original).
235. id
m See id. at 46.
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routinely voted as a bloc to defeat minority-preferred candidates
"interact[ed] with social and historical conditions to cause an in-
equality in the opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters to
elect their preferred representatives." 7  The Court viewed the
central issue as whether "as a result of the challenged practice or
structure, plaintiffs do not have an equal opportunity to participate
in the political processes and to elect candidates of their
choice. , 2
8
The Gingles plurality created a three-part test: to establish
illegal dilution of votes by the majority racial group, minority
plaintiffs first had to show that their group was sufficiently large
and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-
member district; 9 second, that the minority group was politically
cohesive;2' and third, that absent special circumstances, white
majority "bloc voting" usually defeated the minority's chosen can-
didate.24' The Court enumerated factors that could be used to
meet the three-pronged test, including a history of voting discrimi-
nation and racially polarized bloc voting; the jurisdiction's history
of using voting practices that disadvantage the minority group;242
exclusion of minority candidates from slating processes; the extent
to which minority group members continue to experience the ef-
fects of past discrimination which "hinder their ability to participate
effectively in the political process";243 the use of overt or subtle
racial appeals in political campaigns; and the extent to which mi-
nority group members have been elected to public office.2"
Gingles was a turning point in the Court's voting rights juris-
prudence for several reasons. It affirmed the right of a minority
community to be free from vote dilution caused by the majority's
211- Id. at 47.
k2L d. at 44, (citing S. REP. No. 94-417, at 28 (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 206.
" See id. at 50 (noting that in the absence of a large and geographically compact
group, minority voters would still be unsuccessful in electing their candidates).
24a. See id. at 51 (requiring minority claimants to show that their groups share "distinct
(political] interests").
241. See id. at 49-51.
21 See id. at 56-57. The Court gave as examples of such minority-defeating practices
and procedures extremely large districts, majority vote requirements, and prohibitions
against "bullet" voting. See id.
241 Id. at 45 (providing a list of factors which courts should consider in deciding
whether an electoral system is structured to discriminate against minorities).
244 See id. at 45. The Court cited education, employment, and health as areas of dis-
crimination that also could disadvantage a minority group politically. See i&
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bloc voting along racial lines.'4 It also applied the results test,
treating vote dilution as including more than intentional violations.
This appears to be a shift away from the line of cases requiring
proof of intentional discrimination.24 Nevertheless, Gingles has
been criticized for curtailing the scope of the results test and for
having led to a "mechanistic application" of its formula.7'
Gingles can also be seen as the point at which the Court began
moving toward what can be called a "ghetto" requirement. To
show that the "legislative decision to employ multimember, rather
than single-member, districts .. dilute[d] their votes by submerg-
ing them in a white majority,"248 the plaintiffs had to prove that
they likely would succeed if single-member districts were created.
In effect, the Court said that the ability of a minority group to
form a single-member district was the baseline for proving a vote-
dilution violation of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act.24 9 The Court
thus mixed its preferred remedy-the majority-minority dis-
trict-into the determination of whether vote dilution had occurred.
This was a nearly unnoticed, but major, move toward the ghetto
requirement with a stroke of the pen, the Court limited voting
rights remedies to residents of geographically compact minority
enclaves, or, in other words, ghettos.
Gingles did not address the concerns of other politically cohe-
sive minority voters whose preferred candidates are usually defeat-
ed by white majority bloc voting.' Although these three precon-
ditions provide a judicially manageable standard for defining mi-
nority vote dilution, a judicially manageable standard-as demon-
strated in the one person, one vote area--constricts the Court's
245. See Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1994) ("No voting qual-
ification or prerequisite to voting . . . shall be imposed or applied by any State or politi-
cal subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any
citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color.").
246- Section 2(b) of the Voting Rights Act establishes that a violation exists where the
"totality, of circumstances" reveals that "the political processes leading to nomination or
election . . . are not equally open to participation by members of a [protected class] . . .
in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to partici-
pate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice." 42 U.S.C. §
1973(b) (1994).
247. See Inman, supra note 157, at 2049-50 (suggesting that the Court sacrificed its vi-
sion of "fair representation" for a judicially manageable standard for evaluating the merits
of vote dilution claims).
248. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 46.
249. See id.
2 See id. at 52-61.
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vision of fair representation. Gingles was a major step toward the
judicially-created requirement that minority voters form geographi-
cally compact ghettos, 1 justifiable on "traditional" districting
grounds. The Gingles plurality acknowledged this fact without truly
addressing it, commenting:
We have no occasion to consider whether § 2 permits, and
if it does, what standards should pertain to, a claim brought
by a minority group, that is not sufficiently large and com-
pact to constitute a majority in a single-member district,
alleging that the use of a multimember district impairs its
ability to influence elections. 2
In other words, a minority community that is too small, or not
geographically adjoining another minority community with which to
form a majority in a single-member district, has no remedy under
Gingles even if it can prove that its preferred candidates are sys-
tematically defeated by race-based bloc voting of the majority in
which they are submerged.s
2. Shaw v. Reno
In Shaw v. Reno,254 the Court applied its "color-blind" Croso-
n rationale to electoral redistricting and moved dramatically closer
to indirect de jure disenfranchisement. Shaw arose from the 1990
census figures which showed that North Carolina was entitled to an
additional congressional district. 5 The first proposed reapportion-
ment plan provided for one majority-African-American congressio-
nal district, but this plan failed to win § 5 "preclearance." 6 The
North Carolina legislature then submitted a plan providing for two
" See id at 46; see also Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson, Postscript: What is
the Best Route to a Color-Blind Society?, in CoNTRovERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING: THE
VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN PERSPECTrVE 312 (Bernard Grofnian & Chandler Davidson eds.,
1992) (stating that "political ghettoization" concentrates black voters "in a handful of ma-
jority-black districts, with little or no influence in the remaining districts"); Christopher
Eisgruber, Ethnic Segregation by Religion and Race: Reflections on Kiryas Joel and Shaw
v. Reno, 26 CUMB. L. REv. 515 (1996); Inman, supra note 157, at 2051 (identifying the
core value underlying Gingles' three preconditions as a right to proportional representa-
tion-but only for compact, cohesive, and sizable minority groups).
2 478 U.S. at 46 n.12 (emphasis added).
253" See id. at 90 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that the majority's reasoning
means that minority groups must be "large," "geographically concentrated," or "cohesive"
in order to present a successful claim).
2" 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
2". See id. at 635-36.
2-6 See icL
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majority-minority congressional districts, and the United States
Attorney General approved the revised plan.'
White North Carolinians challenged the allocation of a second
majority-minority district, arguing that one of the minority districts
had such a bizarre shape that it should be struck down under the
Fourteenth Amendment because it could only have been designed
as a race-based gerrymander.258 The district court found that the
creation of two majority African-American districts was a prima
facie racial gerrymander which triggered strict scrutiny; however,
the district court found that compliance with the Voting Rights Act
was a sufficiently compelling state interest to withstand strict scru-
tiny.25
9
The Supreme Court reversed, making Shaw the first case in
which the Court elevated geographic compactness from a desirable
attribute to a virtual constitutional requirement for relief from a
deprivation of racial minorities' voting rights. 6  Shaw foreshad-
owed Miller and Vera when it invoked strict scrutiny in part be-
cause of the danger that officials elected from deliberately created
majority-minority districts will "believe that their primary obligation
is to represent only the members of that group, rather than their
constituency as a whole."' This rhetoric is ironic: As Professor
Karlan notes, the Court, while requiring compactness for redress of
race-based vote dilution, has made it clear that compactness is not
a constitutional requirement for groups not defined by race, holding
that "[d]istricts not drawn for impermissible reasons or according to
impermissible criteria may take any shape, even a bizarre one.22
Thus, Professor Karlan has observed: "[G]roups or candidates that
are not identifiable in racial terms-farmers, or Republicans in a
Democratic region of the state, or gays, for that matter--enter the
2'7- See id.
258. District 1 began in northeastern North Carolina, and extended southward "until it
taper[ed] to a narrow band; then, with finger-like extensions, it reache[d] far into the
southernmost part of the State." Id. at 635. In North Carolina, of course, the north-south
dimension is relatively short. District 12 was about 160 miles long and much of it was
no wider than the 1-85 corridor. Its snakelike boundaries ran "through tobacco country,
financial centers, and manufacturing areas 'until it gobbl[ed] in enough enclaves of black
neighborhoods."' Id. at 635-36.
29. See Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461, 470-472 (E.D.N.C. 1992), rev'd, Shaw v.
Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
26o. See id.
261. Id. at 648.
'6 Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 1972 (1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring), quoted in
Karlan, supra note 3, at 308 (1997).
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process with a wide array of solutions that can satisfy their politi-
cal aspirations. If they were the controlling force in the redistrict-
ing process, they would draw their own districts first, and those
districts might well be reasonably compact." 63
As Professor Karlan notes, Justice O'Connor's shameless use of
such terms as "deliberate segregation," "apartheid" 5  and
"balkaniz[ation],"' 6 illustrates vividly the Court's retrogression
toward the Plessy Court's jurisprudence of exclusion. These terms,
drawn from the long "history of political exclusion of black Ameri-
cans[, were used] as a justification for unseating the first black
Representatives elected from North Carolina in this century." 67
3. Miller v. Johnson
Like Shaw, Miller v. Johnson also involved congressional
redistricting following the 1990 Census which entitled Georgia to
an eleventh congressional seat. Because of Georgia's well-docu-
mented history of voting discrimination, Georgia submitted the plan
to the Justice Department for "preclearance" under § 5. The Justice
Department approved the plan after several redrawings, with the
final plan containing three majority-minority districts, including the
additional district.0 9  This "max-black" or "Macon-Savannah
trade" plan270 severed an urban part of Macon from its original
district, uniting it with portions of Savannah by what the court
termed the "narrowest of land bridges." '27 In November 1992,
three African-American Representatives were elected to Congress
from the three newly created majority-minority districts.272 Five
white voters challenged the redrawn districts as a racial gerryman-
der that violated Equal Protection under Shaw.
The Miller district court ruled that Georgia needed only one
majority-minority congressional district out of a total of eleven
districts in the state. Therefore, the district court found that
Georgia's Eleventh Congressional District had not been created
" Karlan, supra note 3, at 308.
See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 641, quoted in Karlan, supra note 17, at 1739.
. See id. at 647, quoted in Karlan, supra note 17, at 1739.
See id. at 657.
. Karlan, supra note 17, at 1739.
"' 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
20- See id. at 907-08.
I d. at 907.
' Id. at 908.
t" See id. at 909.
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properly, 3 because it was created pursuant to a plan that was
not narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state interest. On certio-
rari, the Supreme Court agreed that "[r]ace was . . . the predomi-
nant, overriding factor" in the redrawing of the Eleventh Dis-
trict,274 and described the creation of the eleventh district as "a
tale of disparity, not community,"275 in part because the district
included residents of four discrete, widely spaced urban centers that
had nothing to do with each other. The Court therefore invalidated
the plan under a strict scrutiny analysis.
The Court's analysis in Miller went beyond Shaw, making
compact geographic districts, which some have termed ghettos, a
constitutional requirement for minority vote dilution claims. While
the Shaw opinion invalidated only those minority electoral districts
that could be characterized as "bizarrely shaped," Miller went still
farther, abandoning the Shaw rationale, and holding that regardless
of compactness, race cannot be a "predominant, overriding" factor
in creating districts.276 Justice Kennedy wrote that "[s]hape is rel-
evant not because bizarreness is a necessary element ... or a
threshold requirement of proof, but because it may be persuasive
circumstantial evidence that race for its own sake, and not other
districting principles, was the legislature's dominant and controlling
rationale."2" By invoking the Equal Protection Clause to strike
down a redistricting plan that had received "preclearance," the
Court held that regardless of shape, any congressional district could
be disallowed if race was the predominant factor in the redistricting
process. Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Souter and Breyer,
dissented, noting:
[S]tate legislatures may recognize communities that have a
particular racial or ethnic makeup ... in order to account
for interests common to or shared by the persons grouped
23. See Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1393 (S.D. Ga. 1994) ("we finally
conclude and declare that Georgia's Eleventh Congressional District is unconstitutional in
its current composition."). The district court assumed that the Voting Rights Act compli-
ance could be a compelling interest that would permit racialy-motivated districting to
survive strict scrutiny, but held that the Voting Rights Act did not require more than one
majority-minority district in Georgia. See id. at 1381-82. Thus, the plan creating three
such districts was not narrowly tailored to meet the requirements of the Voting Rights
Act, and failed strict scrutiny analysis.
274. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. at 920.
"5. Id. at 908.
216 Id. at 920.
. Id. at 913.
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together, ... ethnicity itself can tie people together ....
For this reason, ethnicity is a significant force in political
life.. .. Our Nation's cities are full of districts identified
by their ethnic character-Chinese, Irish, Italian, Jewish,
Polish, Russian, for example. The creation of ethnic dis-
tricts reflecting felt identity is not ordinarily viewed as
offensive or demeaning to those included in the delinea-
tionP 8
D. Bush v. Vera: Requiem for Minority Voting
Rights Remedies
In 1996, the Supreme Court's conservative faction, after a de-
cade of chipping away at voting rights remedies by requiring ghet-
tos and proof of intentional discrimination went a step further, and
for all intents and purposed repealed the Voting Rights Act as
recourse for anything other than direct, race-based prevention of
the act of casting a ballot. Until Bush v. Vera,279 the normal rem-
edy for minority vote dilution caused by racially-polarized majority
bloc voting was the creation of majority-minority districts. 210 For
many years, the Supreme Court interpreted the equal protection
clause as guaranteeing political"8  and racial' s  minorities the
right not to have their votes diluted. In Vera, the Court's conser-
vative faction drove the final nail in the coffin of minority voting
rights, and signaled the defeat of a century of struggle. Vera flies
in the face of the legislative history of the 1982 Voting Rights Act
amendment which states clearly that "even a consistently applied
practice premised on a racially neutral policy would not negate a
plaintiff's showing through other factors that the challenged prac-
tice denies minorities fair access to the process."''2
271 Id. at 935, 944-45.
m" 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996).
See, e.g., Thomburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 74 (1986) (invalidating at-large elec-
tion system and multi-member districts in some North Carolina counties); Ketchum v.
Byrne, 740 F.2d 1398, 1413 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that the district court abused its
discretion by not considering, inter alia, the use of supermajorities in redistricting plan),
cert. denied sub nor. City Council of Chicago v. Ketchum, 471 U.S. 1135 (1985).
" See, e.g., Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 124 (1986) (finding that political
gerrymandering claims are subject to equal protection analysis).
m See, e.g., White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765 (1973) (finding vote dilution by
means of multimember districts illegal when used invidiously "to cancel out or minimize
the voting strength of racial groups").
2a S. REP. No. 97-417, at n. 117 (1982).
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Vera arose when Texas became entitled to three additional
congressional seats as a result of the 1990 census.8 4 The Texas
Legislature submitted a redistricting plan creating majority-black
District 30 in Dallas County, majority-Latino District 29 in Harris
County, and redrawing District 18, abutting District 29, as a ma-
jority-black district.285 Six Texas voters challenged the plan in
federal district court under the Fourteenth Amendment, alleging that
the redistricting subjected them to racial gerrymandering in viola-
tion of the fourteenth amendment.8 6
Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Kennedy, found that all but one of the six plaintiffs had personally
been subjected to racial classification, and therefore had standing to
challenge the districts in question.' Analyzing Vera as a mixed-
motive case, the O'Connor plurality first addressed the level of
scrutiny required.8 Finding that Texas had substantially neglect-
ed "traditional" districting criteria such as compactness, that it was
committed from the outset to creating majority-minority districts,
and that it "manipulated" district lines based on detailed racial
data, the plurality chose to apply strict scrutiny to the districts,
requiring the state to show a compelling state interest to justify
their creation. 9 The Court made this determination notwithstand-
ing its finding that "traditional" factors other than race, particularly
incumbency protection, had clearly influenced the legislature's
districting plan.
In invalidating the three districts, the O'Connor plurality cited
"substantial disregard for the traditional districting principles of
compactness and regularity, [and the fact] that the redistricters
pursued unwaveringly the objective of creating [majority-minority]
district[s]."290 The plurality rejected the argument that the non-
traditional district lines were necessary to unite communities of
interest," which had in common a consistently urban character,
shared media sources and major transportation lines to Dallas, and
a history of voting Democratic. The plurality also rejected what it
termed the state's "more substantial claim" that incumbency pro-
2 See Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1950.
2- See id. at 1950-51.
2 See id. at 1951.
2"'- See id.
2 See id.
2" See id. (citing Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995)).
. Id. at 1948.
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tection (traditionally an accepted basis for gerrymandering) was as
important as race in determining the district's shape. Instead, it
found that race had a "qualitatively greater" influence on the draw-
ing of district lines than did political motives, which would not
have been subject to strict scrutiny.2 If political motives had
been found to predominate, of course, the state would only have
been required to show that the district lines were rationally related
to a legitimate state interest, but this would not have been enough
to strike them down, given Texas' need to comply with the Voting
Rights Act. To avoid this outcome, the Court announced that the
obvious political considerations (such as protecting the seats of
incumbents)2' were merely a "proxy" for race, which justified
the application of the same strict scrutiny standard to which out-
right racial discrimination is subject.293
The Court assumed, without deciding, that a state might have a
compelling interest in complying with the anti-vote-dilution provi-
sions of the Voting Rights Act, in which case the state would be
entitled to a "limited degree of leeway," '294 so long as it applied
"traditional" districting principles.295 However, the plurality de-
clared that a state could not use § 2 compliance as a compelling
state interest if doing so would require it to subordinate "tradition-
al" districting principles to race-conscious factors "more than is
reasonably necessary."2  In other words, a state whose "tradition-
al" districting standards and history of intentional discrimination
have placed it within the purview of § 2 may not depart from the
traditional practices that led to the original Voting Rights Act
violation. Having set up this standard, the achievement of which
may well be impossible to achieve in light of the Court's current
jurisprudence, the Court found that the districts at issue failed to
meet it, because they were "bizarrely shaped and far from com-
pact."2 The Court further found that "those characteristics
"'. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 132 (White, J., plurality opinion).
2 See Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 153, at 588 (noting that incumbent office
holders and their political agents, using the redistricting process, choose what configuration
of voters suits their political agenda best).
29. Cf Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991) (holding that race-based peremptory
challenges do not survive equal protection scrutiny merely because members of all races
are subject to like treatment).
2 Vera, 116 S. CL at 1960.
SId. at 1951-52, 1960-61.
296. Id. at 1961. But see Grofman & Davidson, supra note 251, at 300 (advocating the
need for race-conscious remedies in a race-conscious world).
27 Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1961.
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[were] predominantly attributable to gerrymandering that was racial-
ly motivated and/or achieved by the use of race as a proxy,"'
and therefore invalidated all of the majority-minority districts.2'
Paradoxically, this holding means that even if traditional districting
practices have resulted in allowing polarized white voting to defeat
black-preferred candidates on a consistent basis, a state may not
depart from those practices even to achieve compliance with the
Voting Rights Act and to level the playing field for minority vot-
ers.
30o
The Vera rationale reflects the spirit of Justice Joseph P.
Bradley, whose majority opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson3°l held
that segregating blacks and whites in places of public accommoda-
tion did not violate equal protection. Foreshadowing the current
Court, Justice Bradley wrote that there must be some stage in
emancipation when "[the freedman] takes the rank of mere citizen,
and ceases to be the special favorite of the laws, and when his
rights as a citizen, or a man, are to be protected by the ordinary
modes by which other men's rights are protected."3' In a centu-
ry, the Court has come full cycle, approaching the twenty-first
century with the spirit of the nineteenth. 3
Id. at 1949. Justice O'Connor announced the judgment of the Court and delivered
an opinion, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy joined; Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy filed separate concurring opinions. Justices Thomas and Scalia
joined in still another concurring opinion which took the view that the application of
strict scrutiny in Vera was never a close question, since the intentional creation of majori-
ty-minority districts, by itself, is sufficient to invoke such scrutiny. See id. (Thomas, J.
concurring); see also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 201 (1995) (stat-
ing that all government classifications based on race trigger strict scrutiny); Miller v.
Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920-21 (1995) (holding that Georgia's admission that it intention-
ally created majority-minority districts showed that race was a predominant, motivating
factor in its redistricting).
m- See Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1951.
10o- In dissent, Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Souter argued that pursuit of the
majority's color blind logic leads ultimately to declaring the Voting Rights Act unconstitu-
tional. See id. at 2010-11 (Souter, J., dissenting).
s3- Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
- The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883); cf. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist.
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1972) (holding that education is not a fundamental right, and
that disparities in tax basis between Texas school districts did not violate Equal Protection
Clause).
303 The Supreme Court's "color blind" stance parallels strikingly the reasoning in such
cases as Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898) (upholding a literacy requirement
for voters because it did not discriminate on its face). In an interesting foreshadowing of
the Rehnquist Court's intent requirement, the 1898 Court found that the laws in question
had been enacted for a discriminatory purpose, but held the appellant's allegation of dis-
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If participation were the only issue, of course, the Court's
"color blind" approach would be less harmful. However, if the
right to vote is to mean anything at all, it must mean something
akin to the due process right to be heard; it must be more than a
pro forma ritual. Just as a sham trial does not satisfy due process,
the mere ritual formality of casting a vote does not satisfy equal
protection.3" The Court's destruction of the Voting Rights Act
removes all restraints on what has been termed "the superior force
of an interested and over-bearing [white] majority ... ignoring the
interests of racial minorities and their claims to equal respect and
treatment in the governance process. '  The reality is that as we
approach the end of the twentieth century, most direct obstacles to
the casting of ballots have been eliminated.3 6 For all practical
purposes, the Supreme Court's refusal to allow race to be any part
of redistricting decisions puts an end to any minority group using
the Voting Rights Act as a means to redress de jure discrimination.
IV. CONCLUSION: ENDING THE CYCLES: A RETURN TO EQUAL
PROTECTION
Most voting restrictions are subject to strict scrutiny under the
Equal Protection Clause,3°  so that a state must prove that a vot-
ing restriction is narrowly tailored to protect a compelling state
interest, and that no less-restrictive means are available. Felon
crimination insufficient as a matter of law because it failed to allege how, when, and by
whom the discrimination was carried out. See i&
34 See Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV.
29, 30, 39-45 (1985) (suggesting that "Madisonian Republicanism" is really an "intermedi-
ate position" between the traditional republicanism espoused by the Anti-federalists and
interest-group pluralism). For example, Madison rejected the traditional republican model
which argued that direct participation in small republics would prevent faction and tyranny
of the majority, and he rejected the conception of politics as a process consisting only of
trade-offs between competing factions. See id. at 46-47. Sunstein further asserts that the
Equal Protection Clause may be viewed as a rejection of the pluralist view of politics
because it recognizes the evil of 'distributing "resources or opportunities to one group
rather than another solely because those benefitted have exercised the raw power to obtain
governmental assistance." Id. at 50-51.
'0" See Karlan, supra note 17, at 1740 (quoting THE FEDERAiisT No. 10, at 77
(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
3o6 See Issacharoff, supra note 152, at 1838-39 (noting that outright .denial of oppor-
tunities to cast ballots has for the most part been eliminated); id at 1842 (stating that
"precise harms were easy to identify" in denial cases, commenting on the present Court's
preference for rules that are easy to apply).
3" See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342-43 (1972) (striking a residency
requirement of one year in the state and three months in the county).
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disenfranchisement alone is exempted from strict scrutiny. It thus
has survived constitutional challenge °" despite its racially moti-
vated origins and its continuing racially discriminatory impact. It is
possible that state constitutional equal protection guarantees might
nullify such a law, litigation in federal court has been unsuccessful
because of the Court's reading of section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. As of this writing, Underwood is still the only case in
which the Supreme Court has struck down criminal disenfranchise-
ment provisions based on the discriminatory purpose for which
they were adopted.3" Not once in this line of cases has the
Court addressed the real issue: that disproportionate disenfranchise-
ment of minority voters necessarily dilutes minority voting strength.
The right to be heard at the polls is now a right without a
remedy, and the Voting Rights Act stands reduced to a formality
so insubstantial that cases invoking it are now routinely defeated
on summary judgment. The Court's aggressive anti-minority stance
is all the worse, given the lingering effects of the racially motivat-
ed felon disenfranchisement statutes and the disproportionate
criminalization of the minority population.
The right to vote is fundamental to our democratic system of
government, but sadly, the present Court's definition of equal rep-
resentation appears to be satisfied simply by ensuring each individ-
ual formal access to the ballot. The effect that the system has on
the impact and strength of that vote as combined with other votes
is not considered.31° Even an explicit amendment to the Voting
Rights Act that restores the results test and allows for proof of
discriminatory effects without proof of discriminatory intent would
3m See U.S. CONST. amend. XV (prohibiting the denial of voting rights based on race,
color, or previous condition of servitude); U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (granting suffrage to
women); U.S. CONsT. amend. XXIV (outlawing disenfranchisement for failure to pay poll
tax or other tax, but not addressing disenfranchisement for tax-evasion under the criminal
disenfranchisement provision); U.S. CONsT. amend. XXVI (granting the right to vote to
those age 18 and over).
-"- See Shapiro, supra note 35, at 543 (expressing surprise that Underwood "has not
paved the way for similarly successful suits" challenging other state disenfranchisement
laws).
310. See Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 719
(1985) (noting that the minority acquiescence principle, i.e., that minorities are supposed
to lose in a democratic system, is entirely consistent with democratic theory); D. Polsby
& R. Popper, The Third Criterion: Compactness as a Procedural Safeguard Against Parti-
san Gerrymandering, 9 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 301, 315 (1991) (noting that voting is
not an act of utilitarian self-interest but "a means to affirm the philosophy of popular
sovereignty").
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be unlikely to survive. Nevertheless, these changes should be made.
In our system of checks and balances, it is intolerable to let the
oppressive hand of one branch silence the voices in other branches
that would stand up for protection of minority rights. 311 The
Court should abandon the fiction of the "color blind" Constitution
and take into account existing civil disabilities in the minority
population when fashioning remedies, and should adopt an equal
protection analysis for purposes of identifying and remedying of
voting rights violations. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins,312 the Court held
that a facially neutral law which was intended to operate in a
racially discriminatory manner violated equal protection. 1 3 The
Court's current stance is nothing less than an abandonment of its
historical recognition of the right of a minority community to rep-
resentation of its interests.
At least one commentator t 4 has suggested that the § 2 "re-
sults" test could serve as a tool for overturning criminal disenfran-
chisement laws where they dilute minority voting strength.315 He
argues that plaintiffs could show that such laws deny the vote to a
disproportionately non-white class of citizens, resulting in dilution
of the voting strength of the minority community, and thereby
establishing the laws' invalidity under § 2.316 With Vera, how-
ever, the Supreme Court has effectively read the results test out of
the Voting Rights Act, precluding such a strategy. Under the
Court's current approach, it would be difficult to demonstrate that
those directly disenfranchised have been denied the vote "on ac-
count of race." Proving vote dilution would also be difficult. De-
spite the fact that the 1982 Voting Rights Act amendments' legisla-
tive history advises courts to consider statistical data in applying
the results test, assessing the impact of the challenged measure
based on objective factors, there is no indication in the Supreme
Court's recent holdings that it would accept such statistical evi-
3". James Madison recognized that the tendency to form factions is ingrained in hu-
man nature, see Tnm FEDERAuST Nos., 10, 45, 46, 49 (James Madison), but urged that
"the majority, having such coexistent passion or interest, must be rendered, by their num-
ber and local situation, unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of oppression."
Tim FEDERALIST No. 66 (James Madison).
3'2 110 U.S. 356 (1886) (striking down a regulatory ordinance that affected Chinese more
than whites; the Court found a discriminatory purpose based on an otherwise unexplainable differ-
ential impact on a minority group).
313. id.
314 See Shapiro, supra note 35, at 543.
311 Id. at 543-44.
316 See generally Shapiro, supra note 35.
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dence absent a showing that the individual convict had been denied
the vote based explicitly on race. On the contrary, minority citizens
are rapidly losing ground in the battle to influence outcomes at the
ballot box, and that they can expect no recourse from the right-
wing majority on the Rehnquist Court.
The case of felon disenfranchisement shows how devastating
has been the impact of the Supreme Court's "color blind" jurispru-
dence, culminating in Bush v. Vera.317 When considered in the
light of the disproportionate representation of African-Americans
and other minorities in the criminal justice system, felon disenfran-
chise should trigger equal protection concerns. There is indisputable
evidence that the disenfranchisement laws are the product of inten-
tional discrimination, and that they operate with a disproportionate
impact on minority voting pools, leading to a classic case of vote
dilution. Quite simply, the disenfranchisement of felons reduces
electoral access for minority populations as a whole,1M and in the
post-Vera era, no remedy can be framed, even though both dis-
criminatory intent and discriminatory results are present. Nothing
could illustrate more clearly the way in which disproportionate
criminalization of minorities has interacted with "color-blind" juris-
prudence to render violations of the Fifteenth Amendment or the
Voting Rights Act wrongs without a remedy.
Many vote dilution remedies have been proposed.1 9 Propor-
tional voting, for example, has been considered by legal minds as
diverse as Professor Lani Guinier32° and Rep. John C. Calhoun,
"the South Carolina Machiavelli."' According to Professor Mary
A. Inman, a proponent of proportional voting, our present electoral
system can fairly be "labelled 'extreme majority rule' because the
votes of members of any group constituting a minority in a given
37. 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996). The Supreme Court's voting rights jurisprudence has been
aptly described as "teeter[ing] on the brink of legal incoherence and political chaos."
Richard H. Pildes, Principled Limitations on Racial and Partisan Redistricting, 106 YALE
LJ. 2505, 2507 (1997).
3 Shapiro, supra note 35, at 547-48.
3'9. See, e.g., id. at 548 n.60 (suggesting a first amendment strict scrutiny analysis of
felon disenfranchisement on the theory that disenfranchisement silences political speech,
"one of the most fundamental means by which a citizen can speak or express herself
politically . . ").
32 See Gumm, TYRANNY OF THE MAJoRrrY, supra note 3, at 72 (1994) (stating that
the Voting Rights Act should embody the civil rights movement's "transformative vision
of politics"); Guinier, Triumph of Tokenism, supra note 3, at 1084-85 (analyzing various
voting strategies in the context of the civil rights movement's quest for human dignity).
321. ASHmORE, supra note 118, at 390.
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district, are essentially wasted."3' "Where blacks and whites are
geographically separate, race-conscious districting by definition
isolates blacks from potential white allies such as white women
who are not geographically concentrated." 3 3 Furthermore, she
contends that "because majority minority districts isolate the minor-
ity groups, leaving other districts whiter and more Republican, the
representative of a majority minority district is unlikely to exert
significant influence within the legislature: the white representatives
from the remaining districts will likely predominate." The
greatest difficulty with any of these proposed solutions, however, is
that the current Court's willful color-blindness is unlikely to permit
any of them to be implemented?' s
The unholy trinity of Shaw, Miller and Vera have spawned a
host of lawsuits challenging majority-minority districts in various
states.32 The Supreme Court has reached a nadir in its equal
protection jurisprudence and has made a mockery of the struggle
for electoral representation. The remedies are only invoked when
minority-preferred candidates are systematically defeated by racially
polarized majority block voting. The Court's voting rights jurispru-
dence flies in the face of equal protection doctrine, and the legisla-
tive history of the 1982 Voting Rights Act. As the Gingles plurali-
ty observed:
Enforcement of Section 2... should not be viewed as an
undemocratic judicial intrusion into the political pro-
cess .... Much of that influence has come from the pres-
ence of black elected officials with votes to trade within
the halls of Congress, and it is important to remember that
they usually owe the creation of their districts not to the
courts directly, but to the exercise of pressure that Con-
gress vested in the executive branch through creation of the
preclearance requirement and to the horse trading of black
32, Inman, supra note 157, at 1993.
'21 Id. at 2051 (quoting Lani Guinier, The Representation of Minority Interests: The
Question of Single Member Districts, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1135, 1163 (1993)).
321 Id. at 2052 (citing Guinier, supra note 321, at 1163).
" See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 116 S. CL 1941 (1996) Only four Justices assumed that §
2 of the Voting Rights Act is constitutional.
3- Such states include Florida, see Lawyer v. Justice, 65 U.S.L.W. 4629 (1997); Geor-
gia, see Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1354 (S.D. Ga 1994); Louisiana, see Reno v.
Bossier Parish, 117 S. CL 1491 (1997); Hays v. Louisiana, 839 F. Supp. 1188 (W.D. La.
1993), vacated, Louisiana v. Hays, 512 U.S. 1230 (1994); and Missouri, see Tyus v.
Schoemehl, 93 F.3d 449 (8th Cir. 1996).
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legislative caucuses within state legislatures.327
In the early years of this century, W.E.B. DuBois addressed
"the strange meaning of being black at the dawning of the Twenti-
eth Century. This meaning is not without interest ... for the prob-
lem of the Twentieth Century is the problem of the color
line."3' Sadly, racial bias is still a fact of life in America at the
turn of the twenty-first century, and race and fairness issues are the
unfinished business of our democracy. Discussion of these issues
must recognize that the nation's recent history means that minori-
ties may have a community of interest. The Court's disingenuous
attempts to deny any community or commonality of interest apart
from the majority's interest in maintaining "traditional American
principles" of geographic racial placement simply exacerbates the
legacy of racism. To deny equal protection of the laws under the
pretext of establishing a "color-blind" system is to perpetuate his-
toric wrongs.
Under the Voting Rights Act of 1964, Congress has promised
minority citizens that the Fourteenth Amendment will give them -
equal protection at the ballot box. The Department of Justice is
responsible for earning its name by ensuring that states comply. It
is time to recognize that vote dilution does deny minority commu-
nities the right to equal protection of the laws, and to recognize
the lingering discriminatory effect of practices, such as felon disen-
franchisement, originally adopted for the express purpose of exclud-
ing the minority population from participation in the electoral pro-
cess. The Court must resist the temptation to emulate the Taney
Court, and must do its part to level the playing field. At least the
Court should take into account the disproportionate disenfranchise-
ment rates among minority populations when fashioning "safe" dis-
tricts under the Voting Rights Act; and provide for an orderly
uniform method of restoring rights to those who have served their
time.
The "color blind" Court has rejected equal protection-based
voting litigation, in large part based on an extremely restrictive re-
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause, and it has for all practical purposes nullified the Voting
Rights Act by reading into it a non-existent requirement of show-
327. Karlan, supra note 17, at 1738-39.
321 W.E.B. DuBois, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 1 (1903), quoted in Schmidt, supra
note 5, at 444.
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ing a discriminatory intent. Justices Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg
have had the courage to point out that the "failure to provide a
practical standard for distinguishing between the lawful and unlaw-
ful use of race," has resulted in "inevitable confusion."329 To
avoid consideration of race, as the Court's right wing would do, is
at worst, the Plessy Court redux, and at best, misconceived.
The Court has radically reduced the number of cases it has
taken in recent years, so it is difficult not to see an agenda similar
to the "Mississippi Plan" behind the selective choice of cases in
which to implement "color blind" erosion of the franchise for all
but the white majority. As Moorefield Storey replied, when con-
fronted with the argument that segregated housing affected blacks
and whites equally, "A law which forbids a Negro to rise is not
made just because it forbids a white man to fall.""33
The cycle of exclusion has come nearly full circle, and it will
not end until the Supreme Court returns to the true meaning of
equal protection, protecting minority citizens "with the same shield
which it throws over the white man ... [both] being alike citizens
of the United States, both bound to obey the same laws, to sustain
the same burdens of the same Government, and both equally re-
sponsible to justice and to God. . ."" In the end, we cannot
justify a return to legally-sanctioned white supremacy by invoking
the mantra, "Our Constitution is color-blind."
. Vera, 116 S. Ct. at 1998 (Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
330 Moorfield Storey, attorney for the appellants in Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60
(1917), quoted in Schmidt, supra note 5, at 504.
331. Speech of Sen. Howard (May 23, 1866), in CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
2766 (1866).
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AppendlxA:
States Which Disenfranchise Permanently or Make Restoration of Rights Difficult
sta ator,-. Comments_
Alabam A ON . 'Nopon convitdof a ftovy inolig moral trtude ... shall equaiedtovoteun
art Vil, § 18(b) Ms on ofeiv andp utica ightL."
ACODE Person conicted ofoffets meiondin de Vi ofth Constitu o ofAlbama my be
§ 17.3-10(1994) restorediorighraonlybyapardon. Tbapardonm rspeaflymenionmraonofghBand
must be acoried by rb ame ton ofdge ordistict anemy no restationaIlowed for
paw convict edoftreason an d impeachment"
Ari= ARM COST. No per oonvicte oftr ason or fdony beualified to vot in any ection unless they re
art V11,§2 rstoredth&,ivilrigt.
AR. REv. STAT. Am. "Upon completon ofpbaon ora least two ta om te date of bsolue dich a peron
1113-90,13-906 may haveny iilriht wic rlo r spne d bacoaiconvcnre urd by hese~rior
(West1996) counjudge who setence hmorhi succors in office m countyin wch e was
_________ oriiallyenowcc.
CRMta11 CAL CO,. Dalulcfaion whle impri l or on parole for fdlony conviction.
art II, §4 (ameded 1974)
CAL EtEc CODE Dislaes arons i  prison or on paole for felony conictio pron; on not mmmid
12101 (Wes 1996)
CAL CoDE Provides for cancl of votn gregistation upon oof that the person is itearly imprisoned
§ 2201(c) (West 1996) or on parole for foelny conviction.
CAL P&MACODE Patapplic atinfor a c iicte of rablmon nd pardone uderrain ciomrroni
§045.01 (Weat 1996) _____________________
Florida FLA CO a'T. Noperon convicted ofa fdoy.. shl qualie dto vote or hold o c: nl rstorion of
arVI,§4 civil gsor removeal oftiaabity."
FLA. STAT.A Am. "Upon conviction ofa felony... the cil rghts of a person o viced Malbe suspended ... until
§944.292 (We 1996) fights am retored by a full p ardon, nditioa padon, or resoron of civl rh ant
to s. 8, Art. IV of the Stat CoDrtlon."
FRASAT, NN. "N follaowin rss eot ened to register or t & ... (b) Persons convicted of ny
§ 97.041O(Xb) felonyby y cut of record an idvil fts have not been restored"
(West 199)
FL STAT.A.m Restoron occr uon l)receiving a f pardn e Board ofPardons 2)n ing the
1 940.05 (West 1990) mam lam of theaeatoe;or 3) eggrnted hi rlease byParo Commission.
Im IOWA CON. 'No.. .eron conv ofany i ous criesh b tld to t p of n or "
artl1, §5: An infamu cr ime mady punishable by impffsonanrn i  the peziteotlary." See Stat
Disqualifiedpersons v.Hubrich, 83 N.W.2d 451 (los 19M. In orn rto be restd to the priviege of an elecr, a
peon vho has been e a im most be gia a certificae of resrtorion to all
of the rights ofeitizeaship by the governor. 1923-24 Op. Atty Gen. 235.
Kas KA CO MT. "lhe legislu may, by law, exde p from votng bec of... comitment to ajail or
arV,§2 pealwtn.Noper on nniced of a fdoy under the laws ofany sta orof he Unied
Sieiesa doedrordtois~ghrsrh h~e~i ed oe
Keatnly KY.COsT. To right tovo is denid )for aconviction of a ftlony, treason. ab y in a election,"or of
§ 145 such eigh nmi.sa ioras thGeneral Assm lymayde e Mll oper'teas an excuson om the
finh e of1n ele csson fr d m beir xi oen " r do;our2)fr onteo,.
the__ _ _ __ _ _ tie oth cion ar n corften u ndr e gof a o t frso p!2a offae
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Appendix A:
States Which Disenfranchise Permanently or Make Restoration of Rights Difficult
Stle: tlton Comments:
.adasaa L CO9.T. "[lkiight[tovote] maybe susnded wil e a peron is inter land judically declaredmely
a.L § 10 incompetnt or is undern orderoffporionanat for conviction s ffeony."
LA. COWr. 'Full fights of z=i Np shall be restored upon termination of state and federal supervision
ar. 1, § 20 following convition for any offeneY
75 Op. Atty 75 "Convicted felon on poiion ca vote but one on role is ilegal arsody and ca not vt"
(1975)
Minnesota MMC. A person convicted o f treason rfdony shal not be eted or pntted to vo nless their dcl




MIe. STAT. AeL "Whn a pron has bee deprived ofcivl ights by reson ofa convicoan ofa crime andis
§ 609.165 (West 1992) theat dins c dscharge h a reore th peron to all civi t and ful i p,
with full fight to vote and hold office the ae as if such cnviction ad not Ulen plce, and the
__ __o rder ofasbm all sproide
MItsppl Ms CoNin. Voting Rights lost for enumerat offaens: murder, rape, bribery, thef .son, obaning money or
rt. XII. §241 oods uner fal pretense. edu/ry, forgery, embezlement orbiganm,..
Missouri Mo. REv. STAT. D fnchisamonn while in prison, or on probation or parole for a feony, and permanent
§ 115.133(2) 1993) disenfranisemnt for election offenses.
Mo. REV. STAT. Diseaftanchbsia etwhile in prison, and pemanent di .nftanhiseren for election felonies.
§ 561.026(I) (Sump. 1993)
Nebraska NB. REV. STAT. Di nchismnt for all feloni aontil placed on probtion.
§ 29-112 (1995)
NEPLRV.STAT. Posision for probtion and restoration ofaigbt.
629.2269(1995)
New Jersey NJ. STAT. ARL Defranchisorn.nt if convited ofa crime under the laws ofew Jersey another state, or he
S2C.51-3 (Wet 1995) United Stno.
NJ. STAT. Am. Dionranchiaenrint w el aroing aa eeoce, on parole, oron probation for any crim of New
§ 19:4-1(lWest 1995) J .anohor stat or the Unite Stat
NewYork N.Y.EL c.LAW Dioeafbifse tif onvictdfa crio unethelal rs fNewaYork, another sate, or the
§ 5-106(2.(5) United Staes, and Ifth pnish n t Is by death or imprisonment.
(Mcinney 1977)
North NC. G2L STAT. Upon being adjudged gusilty of a feony, "unles that person shall be firt resored to the sights of
Cron § 163-55(2) (1995) citimahip in thema mr presibed by lw."
TUD-An .e 1oLC . Dise fancbltrent for an infmous crime.
Ths. CODED As "Upon conviction forany felony, it shall be thejudgonet of the court thnt he defendant be
140-20-112(1997) infamous and be mmedately disaqufled from aercining the tight of -afg "
Tx CoDoe ' nt Peon eligible to have fights retored "u" Pardon nd ight living, on petition a d showing in
§ 40-211-112 note (1997) circu cou"
(Restorattion Aftr Pardon),
cifig ln re O,*, 6 Tenn.
Cv.App. (6 HIEggins) 12
(1915)
VIrginia VA.Cow,'isT. Dioncfiaent upon coniction ofa felony unless "civits have been restored by the
21LII, § I Goveroror othrappropriatezuttority."
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State: ateil. Comnts:
WMO. Di en un c tion of temson r felony, ure restor todvil rights.
&tlI9, 2(4Xa)
W. STAT. AM. D upon comicon ofmm fdony, or ibey, unls rerd to civ rights.
§6.03(I)b)
(West Supp. 1996)
WS. STAT. AN. eoro occurs pon sig tam ofi m somneat or othemise saving a senteote.
13.078 (West 1996)
Wyoming WYO.CO,'ST. ]m7 ons conviced of oec unles re to isv egbt, are adde from t dectin
art If.§27 fnchise"
WYO.COszr. Prohibits special !islvin bills to restore civil rights.
snVI, j6
WYO. STAT. At. Diseafsnchis upon felony covstion uless the con'ction is revesed,a pardon is rA or
16-10-106 dvil rights have been resord.
Mirchie 1997)
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AppendlxB:
States Which Do Not Disenfranhise or Which Have Automatic or Relatively Simple Restoration of
Voting Rights:
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Aia ALMS"CASTAT. P ure iupon mooftdh T s appary incudes completon of
if15.05.030,15.07.135,33.30241 theperson i dllydischar-,edtfrm irobaionatiforparrol
Kch!1996)wt




(west 1992) _ _ _ _ _ _
Aeka= Aix CWsr. Upon di.qe of sentence orpa*&
U.LIf 1.2,
Cordo COLO C . AomaicuponnIlcasmconfmeas
CLo.REv.STAT.Am
I 1-2.103(4) (West 1993)
Connedclt i ot GEKSTA.Ant, Peron may regsnt prea6ing ofof
If 9.W a), 9.469a) (Wes 1993) discha from coflnA parole, orpmb-
aton, and pofoffpaymet ofaay fi _ _ _ _ _
Dehaure DELCos. Automatic res oaion 10 years following a





Georgla GA. C T Automatic "upon com on of etee"
artI, 1,13(a)
Rhw,"n HAW.CO . No d i eig parole or dle Notion d arge papes i=cates
arti,62 serng uspendsed ice; otemc tha person's civlari ,,ave bee r
frhse lost upon sncing for felony and stored.
HAW. REV. STAT. ARL atom ily retord at discdrge
1183 1-2 83 1.5 (Mcio 1993) ______________
dho IDAHOCOWs. No ne cavo if cvited of a fdony at any
atVLI3 place, unl resated to rihtL
Rights stod o pletonof sewe=
DAS CODE prbation, r parole
I11-310(1997) ______________
Maine ME REV. STAT.A. No diseoisesenpovision.
tit.1A,j Il 1115(Westl993) _______________
MUYW D M t.A.COne A ac upon completion of snsenc. r.t-ie offerde s only.
art. 33, §3-4(c) (1998) I
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
AppendixB:
States Which Do Not Disenfranchise or Which Have Automatic or Relatively Simple Restoration of
VotingRights:
Stal Citation: Method ofiRstton of Fr fie Comment.
Massachusetts M5 .C0s. No eo cepfor eleion of- Coorecio iton inmates, who
pL1,1art fe. am dy qauied, regis rois in a
munildpality, have he rigiht to vote in
M s.G LA state el ctions.. Se D Yv. Boadl of
ch.51, 11 (West 1991) Registrar of Voters of Concord, 371
N.E 1358 (Mass. 1978).
MS.GENS. LAWS ANNt.
ch. 55,3 24 (West 1991)
Mootana M0e.CoDEAN. Automatic upon ompletion of.swene
I 13.1.111(2) 1997M___________________ ________________
Oklbhoma OLA. STAT. NN. Automc at of prscibed in
tit 263, 4.101(I) West 1997) jugment a dsentece
OKL. STAT. ke
6L 26, 14.120 (West 1991)
PenISlVonia PA.STAT.AN. Automaticuonexpirtionof5yersafteth Whilethe crmes of buglary nd
6L25,96l.501(a) endofimprisoo t larcenyare in thenatue of cimen falsi,
(westSupp. 1997) they a not infamous cime v it the
meaning of PA. COST. at. 2, § 7. See
Commonwe lth rdael dy.
F__ _ _ _, 13 Pa. D. & C3d58 (1979).
South S.C. CODE AN. Automatic upon eri e of th sentence,
Carolina 7.5-120(BX2)-(3) inclding Probaion and paroletime "unless
(Law Co-op. Supp. 1997) soonerpardc ."
Texas Tx. COLST. Automatic, two years from issac: of
at V1, §I discharge papers at end of sentence;icluding
probationandparole.
Tx ELEc COno.
§ I .02(4)(A) (West Supp. 1993)
Utah UTAHCONST. No felon dafanchiseent provision. Psoneos vote absentee in couny of
art IV, § 2 priorresidence. Se Dodge v. Ean
716 P.2d 270 (Utah 1985).
West Virgiia W.VA. Cow. Automatic upon smice of s =te. sn as full tern is Served or upon
aat1IV, §1 prointgig ht sarerestor&
See 51 Op. Att G 182(1945).
W.VA.CODE§ 3.1.3(1990)
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Ca11fornla CAL CO-". / Ijio y, CAL CONS.
res.art4 U, § 1 (repealed 1974)
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'infamous crW which
was lfited in Olsuka v.
Hie,414 P.2 412 (CaL




threat to theintegityof the
_______ _______elective process.
Connecticut C O OW.STAT /(oher FormrCo Th. fose imprisoned but not
Am th non. CON. a't. VI, disnnbzndrhed can
119-w6a), suppr) 13(amended apparanlyvoteahseonee
9.4 a) 1875) unadrCosr. Ot STAT
(West 1989) (supsedd ANN.I 9-14a (West 1989)
emram ted (Any person i the cost.
bribeay, forgery, odyofthestatebeingheld
pery, at a commnity correions
&eog. frud- centr oracrectional
ulentbank. stition, whose voting
ruptcy, and rights have not been
the&t det14 hallbe demed to
be absent from the town or
cityof which heis an
inhabitntforpptisesof
Itoting....")
Delaware DEL CONS?. DEL CoNS?.
artV.12 art.V, 11
Qalications
DEL COvS. I for Voting also
ase.V. §7 disqalifies
those Unable to
DELCoOCEtot m ad the st&t
tit. I, §1701 constiton in
(1981) English.





CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
Appendix C:
Enumerated Offenses and Categories Trigering Disenfranchfsement
Cia on Felony or lofanb s Laumy "Moral Eeclon OtherCr mes: Co-
Treason Crime turpitde" Crimes
Floida FA STAT. Am. / Fomerlyref ercd t
.97.041 (Wo: ionfam es-Th
1987&Supp. Florida Attorney Gene






applied was %ther the








constituting a felony under
fedemldanes could be
decied conviction fan
infonmu cin. Op. MnY
Ge. 203 (1951).
Georgia G .CoS.2 /
ILl I,113(a)
GA. CODE a I
21-2-219(a.I)(1)
Hawail HAW. REV. STAT. Upon sentencing for a
k0L felony unle setence is
§831.2 spended.
" ice 1993)
Idaho IDAHO C ST. Befooitwasaamndedin
arL VI, §3 1981, IAOCOM.art.
VI, 13 disenfranchised
IDAHO C DE those confined inprison on
118-3 10 (1997) conviction f cminal
offenses, a  well as thoo
convicted of felony. ts-
son,nhezle erntofthe
public fonds, bartering or
selling, orofferng to barte
or sell his vote, or
purchasigorofferingto
purchase the vote of
another, or oth&inawaos
____ __ _ ____ crimes.
Indimn 1IND. COWS./
Iow IOWACONST. ar. /
Maryland RD'CONSr.2
m 1., § 2- = -
[Vol. 48:727
DISENFRANCHISEMENT OF MINORITY VOTERS
Appendix C:
Enumerated Offenses and Categories Triggering Disenfranchisement
Ciation Felonyor "Id ms Lu "MorMI Edlon Other Crimes: Comments
Trea Crie trotwe Crmes
MSmehMUs MAMGM.. Only for cton offms;
LuAV~ le oierfacaicete ons




MespMIssiifi m.CONS.srl Offenses listed
12,§241 in staute.
MoOMMa * MOsT.COD / W1ile s$ngsen=ce
1 13-1.111(2)
(1993)
New NIL CO=. / / Trason, brbey & electon
Hi pt.Lx6t . _ _II offenss only.
NewMelco N.M.Co-,r. , /
oat V I,§ 
North N.C.COM. /
Caoin artV,12
South S.C.CoAsE.. I / Anyone
Carolina li7-54120(BX2)- "lavdgunder
() (Law. Co p. disab res








Vlrgln ds VLCODAs. / Tea em upon two felony
dt. 18,1263(a) convictioas sivohing
(1998) mrtuitudeothrois,
_ one yearfrom discharge
U1rgls VA. COWS.
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Enumerated Offenses and Categories ering Disenfranchisement
Citation Felony or "InffamouP Lrceny "Moral elion OthcOr men Comments
Treason Crime turpttude" crimes
Wyoming Wyo.cOwr. t/
111. f 27
WYo. STAr. Am.
f 6-10-106
(Kchic 1997)
[Vol. 48:727
